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HABEAS AFTER PINHOLSTER 
Samuel R. Wiseman* 
Abstract: Until April 2011, every federal habeas court in America could 
conduct hearings and consider new evidence when reviewing a state 
court’s interpretation of federal law under the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). When state proceedings did not allow a peti-
tioner a fair chance to develop the factual record, federal courts could, 
and sometimes did, fill the gap. The U.S. Supreme Court’s 2011 opinion 
in Cullen v. Pinholster significantly altered this landscape. By limiting federal 
review to the state record for claims already adjudicated in state court, Pin-
holster places an enormous premium on the adequate development of the 
state-court record. After Pinholster, petitioners denied the ability to develop 
their claims in state court will seek alternative solutions. Indeed, state de-
fendants have already begun to pursue some of the potential paths around 
Pinholster, suggesting what is to come. The resulting challenges will raise 
fundamental, unanswered questions about AEDPA, the Suspension Clause, 
and the role of due process in postconviction review. This Article explores 
likely paths forward, filling the gaps that Pinholster, together with the 
Court’s recent decisions in Boumediene v. Bush, District Attorney’s Office v. Os-
borne, and Skinner v. Switzer, has created in both the literature and the ju-
risprudence. 
Introduction 
 At first glance, the 2011 case Cullen v. Pinholster 1 appears to be just 
another in a long line of U.S. Supreme Court opinions reversing the 
Ninth Circuit and making it more difficult for state prisoners to obtain 
federal habeas relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Pen-
alty Act (AEDPA).2 Which, of course, it is. Nor was the portion of the 
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1 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011). 
2 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-
132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18, 22, 28, and 42 
U.S.C.). This may account for the dearth of immediate attention to Pinholster. There has 
been surprisingly little discussion in the online media. The little attention that scholars 
have paid to the Pinholster opinion has focused on somewhat narrower (although equally 
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opinion that will be the focus of this Article—the portion limiting fed-
eral review of claims previously adjudicated at the state level to the 
state-court record—particularly divisive: it attracted seven votes.3 But 
Pinholster will have significant ramifications, not just for the habeas peti-
tioners immediately affected, but for the resolution of fundamental 
questions surrounding AEDPA, the Suspension Clause, and postconvic-
tion due process. 
 Prior to Pinholster, petitioners who were barred from adequately 
developing their claims in state court could do so in federal court.4 As 
an example, consider Albert Richards. Richards, a homeless ex-Marine 
with a serious heart condition and a crack habit, was convicted of mur-
dering another homeless man in Tarrant County, Texas, by beating him 
with a rock; the victim died hours after the beating.5 At trial, Richards’s 
attorney used hearsay objections to prevent the prosecution from in-
troducing evidence that the victim had suffered another, more serious 
attack after the altercation with Richards, and she failed to introduce 
this evidence herself.6 
                                                                                                                      
important) issues. Katherine McAllister, for example, briefly discusses deference to state 
courts and attorneys under the Strickland standard following Pinholster, as well as the im-
pacts on capital defendants. See Katherine A. McAllister, Comment, Deferential Dilemmas: 
Pinholster v. Ayers and Federal Habeas Claims for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel After AEDPA, 
52 B.C. L. Rev. E. Supp. 121, 127–31 (2011), http://www.bc.edu/bclr/esupp_2011/10_ 
mcallister.pdf. Professor Nancy King believes that Pinholster will be most important for capi-
tal defendants. Nancy King, Beyond Cullen v. Pinholster: When New Evidence Amounts to a 
“New Claim,” habeasbook.com (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.habeasbook.com/2011/04/ 
beyond-cullen-v-pinholster-when-new-evidence-amounts-to-a-new-claim/ (arguing that  fed-
eral evidentiary hearings, like grants of relief, almost never occur in non-capital habeas 
cases and that “[Pinholster] is likely to have its most significant impact in capital cases”). 
Professor King correctly observes that habeas already is rarely granted and that federal 
hearings are rarely held in habeas cases. See id. Professor King’s argument that courts 
rarely grant federal evidentiary hearings—citing to Justice Sotomayor’s observation in her 
Pinholster dissent that such hearings are “very rare” —does not, however, address the issue 
explored here: that, for the narrow but important set of prisoners who might have ob-
tained habeas relief, Pinholster prohibits all federal expansion of the record, not just evi-
dentiary hearings. See infra notes 69–79 and accompanying text. Moreover, as Professor 
King herself has shown, federal evidentiary hearings, though rare, are strongly correlated 
with success. See Nancy J. King et al., Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in 
U.S. District Courts: An Empirical Study of Habeas Corpus Cases Filed by State 
Prisoners Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, at 
10 (2007). 
3 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1388, 1394 n.*. 
4 See infra notes 32–56 and accompanying text. 
5 Richards v. Quarterman (Richards I ), 578 F. Supp. 2d 849, 855, 864, 865, 869–70 
(N.D. Tex. 2008), aff’d, 566 F.3d 553 (5th Cir. 2009). 
6 Id. at 855, 859–64. 
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 The state hearing on Richards’s ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim consisted of a single affidavit from Richards’s trial counsel, which 
was requested by the state; Richards, acting pro se, was not allowed to 
participate in the expansion of the record.7 This affidavit, which stated 
that trial counsel had “presented any and all exculpatory evidence 
available to [her],” helped convince the state court to adopt the state 
attorney’s findings of fact and conclusions of law wholesale.8 It was 
enough, too, to satisfy the federal magistrate judge assigned to the 
case.9 It did not, however, satisfy the district court, which held a federal 
evidentiary hearing—a step that the court found permissible under 
AEDPA because Richards had not “failed to develop the factual basis” 
for his claim.10 As was revealed at that hearing, Richards’s trial counsel 
prepared her affidavit “in consultation with, and with the assistance of, 
the [state’s attorney].”11 The federal hearing also revealed enough evi-
dence to persuade the Fifth Circuit—a court not generally known for 
being amenable to habeas claims12—that it was “extremely likely that, 
but for [trial counsel’s] objectively unreasonable representation of 
Richards, the jury would have concluded that the later assault led to 
[the victim’s] death.”13 
 Development of the facts in federal district court helped Richards 
overcome the incomplete record from the woefully inadequate state 
proceedings. The reasoning underlying the district court’s decision to 
grant Richards an evidentiary hearing was endorsed by every circuit to 
have considered the issue.14 After Pinholster, however, that reasoning is 
                                                                                                                      
 
7 Id. at 852. 
8 Richards v. Quarterman (Richards II ), 566 F.3d 553, 559–60 (5th Cir. 2009). 
9 Richards v. Quarterman, No. 4:07-CV-118-A, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121643, at *18 
(N.D. Tex. Apr. 24, 2008). 
10 Richards I, 578 F. Supp. 2d at 852–53 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006)). 
11 Id. at 852. 
12 See Gregory J. O’Meara, “You Can’t Get There from Here?”: Ineffective Assistance Claims in 
Federal Circuit Courts After AEDPA, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 545, 576–77 (2009) (characterizing the 
Fifth Circuit as taking a restrictive approach to habeas petitions after AEDPA). The Su-
preme Court, for example, reversed the Fifth Circuit twice in the same post-AEDPA habeas 
matter. See Miller-El v. Johnson, 261 F.3d 445, 452, 454, 455 (5th Cir. 2001) (denying peti-
tioner’s request for a Certificate of Appealability on each of four independent grounds), 
rev’d sub nom. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327 (2003), remanded to sub nom. Miller-El 
v. Dretke, 361 F.3d 849, 862 (5th Cir. 2004) (denying petitioner’s claims on the merits), 
rev’d, 545 U.S. 231 (2005). 
13 Richards II, 566 F.3d at 571. 
14 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that, prior to Pinhol-
ster, circuit courts had taken two approaches to applying § 2254(d)(1), both of which allowed 
new evidence to be considered, and concluding that the majority’s approach of barring evi-
dence outside of the state record “charts a third, novel course that, so far as I am aware, no 
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no longer valid.15 This will make it more difficult for petitioners to ob-
tain relief, and in light of the current controversy over whether the cost 
of federal habeas review of non-capital state convictions is justified by 
the relatively small number of successful petitions, every narrowing of 
that pool is particularly significant.16 Even more important, however, 
are the issues facing the courts in the post-Pinholster world. 
 The problem of inadequate state fact-development proceedings, 
illustrated so starkly by cases like Richards’s, is too great to ignore. Prior 
to AEDPA, federal courts deferred to state court factual findings only if 
specific and rigorous procedural safeguards were followed.17 Although 
AEDPA removed these requirements,18 some leading scholars and 
courts have nonetheless produced readings of AEDPA that incorporate 
at least a weakened procedural fairness prerequisite to deference, some 
of which remain viable after Pinholster.19 The Supreme Court and many 
of the circuits, however, have thus far avoided the issue, likely because 
of the role of federal fact development in preventing injustice in the 
face of obvious breakdowns in state process. With this failsafe removed 
by Pinholster, the critical, long-simmering question of whether AEDPA is 
truly indifferent to the fairness of the state court adjudications under 
review will have to be decided.20 
 Nor is this the only significant issue likely to be decided as a result 
of petitioners’ efforts to overcome the hurdle erected by Pinholster. In a 
case decided a few months before Pinholster, the Court declared that 
when a state court has denied relief on a federal claim, “it may be pre-
sumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the merits in the 
                                                                                                                      
court of appeals has adopted”); see also Brian R. Means, Postconviction Remedies § 22:17 
(2011 ed.) (quoting Campbell v. Vaughn, 209 F.3d 280, 287 (3d Cir. 2000)). 
15 See infra notes 90–93 and accompanying text. 
16 See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal 
Justice, 84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791, 797–98 (2009) (proposing to limit federal habeas review for 
non-capital state defendants because of the high costs that it imposes). 
17 See Larry W. Yackle, Federal Evidentiary Hearings Under the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 6 
B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 135, 140–41 (1996). 
18 See id. (describing how AEDPA “drop[ped] the specific procedural and substantive 
standards contained in the former § 2254(d)”). 
19 See, e.g., Justin F. Marceau, Don’t Forget Due Process: The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 
Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 Hastings L.J. 1, 4–5, 62–63 (2010) (arguing that courts 
should not give deference to facts from state proceedings that were not “full and fair,” and 
citing to courts that have followed this approach); Yackle, supra note 17, at 140–41 (argu-
ing that the new § 2254(e)(1) raises “serious constitutional questions”); infra notes 165, 
179, 182 (discussing courts that have so held). 
20 Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus Statute, 44 Buff. L. Rev. 381, 402 
(1996) (arguing that the “crucial question is the nature and measure of the significance 
§ 2254(d) instructs a federal district court to attach to a previous state judgment”). 
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absence of any indication . . . to the contrary.”21 If the Court continues 
down the path of treating all state court decisions equally regardless of 
how they were reached and severs AEDPA from any interest in the qual-
ity of the state postconviction process, Suspension Clause challenges 
will quickly follow. To resolve these challenges, the Court will need to 
provide answers to the basic but unresolved questions of whether the 
right to federal habeas extends to state prisoners—and if so, what it 
guarantees. In Boumediene v. Bush in 2008, the Supreme Court spoke of 
a right to a “full and fair opportunity” for fact development,22 but the 
definition of “opportunity” has remained an open question for thirty 
years.23 
 Important developments in postconviction due process are also 
likely. In a pair of recent cases, the Court has established a right to fun-
damental fairness in state postconviction procedures and cleared the 
way for claims under that right to be pursued through 42 U.S.C. § 
1983.24 These claims represent another avenue, independent of 
AEDPA, for addressing inadequate state fact development after Pinhol-
ster. Here, too, a question that the Court has left open will need an an-
swer: is procedural due process offended by an unfair application of a 
generally fair set of rules? 
 The critical issues to be decided in the wake of Pinholster will have a 
dramatic effect on the future of postconviction litigation. Each could 
be, and often has been, the object of independent study. This Article 
examines these pressing questions in light of Pinholster and other recent 
cases that have altered the postconviction landscape. Part I provides an 
account of Pinholster and its immediate effects, and argues that by 
sharply curtailing federal fact development, Pinholster will provoke a 
variety of challenges to the fairness of state procedures.25 Part II, build-
ing from the literature, identifies the likely routes that petitioners seek-
ing to overcome deficient state proceedings will take to finding, at last, 
                                                                                                                      
21 Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011); see also id. at 786 (“Section 
2254(d) reflects the view that habeas corpus is a guard against extreme malfunctions in the 
state criminal justice systems, not a substitute for ordinary error correction through ap-
peal.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
22 553 U.S. 723, 790–91 (2008). 
23 See infra notes 242–248 (discussing courts’ differing approaches to “opportunity” 
since Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976)). 
24 See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1296, 1298 (2011) (holding that a petitioner 
may bring a due process challenge to a state’s postconviction DNA access procedures 
through a § 1983 claim); Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009) 
(holding that due process requires that state procedures for establishing innocence based 
on new evidence after conviction be fundamentally fair). 
25 See infra notes 28–130 and accompanying text. 
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a guarantee of procedural fairness in AEDPA.26 Part III discusses the 
Suspension Clause and due process challenges that are likely to emerge 
in the aftermath of Pinholster, as well as the fundamental, unanswered 
questions that they will raise about the nature of fairness in postconvic-
tion review.27 
I. Pinholster and Its Impact 
 Prior to Pinholster, federal habeas petitioners had access28 to evi-
dentiary hearings and other avenues of federal fact development to 
allow them to adduce new evidence to overcome AEDPA’s high bar to 
relief on claims previously adjudicated in a state court.29 For petitioners 
who had not had an adequate opportunity to develop the facts in state 
court, federal hearings and discovery served as a backstop of sorts— 
albeit an imperfect one, as federal hearings remained subject to 
AEDPA’s highly deferential standards. Pinholster eliminated this back-
stop by limiting review of previously adjudicated claims to the state-
court record. Accordingly, fact development in the state courts—which 
had always been extremely important under AEDPA—is now even 
more vital to a petitioner’s claim. Section A introduces AEDPA and the 
pre-Pinholster approach to federal fact development.30 Section B dis-
cusses the Pinholster opinion and explains why Pinholster creates a sig-
nificant barrier for federal habeas petitioners who did not or were un-
able to fully develop the factual record in state court.31 
A. Habeas Under AEDPA 
 The writ of habeas corpus has long been the primary procedural 
vehicle for challenging unconstitutional detentions.32 And although 
                                                                                                                      
26 See infra notes 131–203 and accompanying text. 
27 See infra notes 204–282 and accompanying text. 
28 As discussed below, this access was limited to petitioners who had not “failed to de-
velop the factual basis” of their claim in state court. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) (2006); infra 
note 47 and accompanying text. 
29 Although relatively few evidentiary hearings are granted, they are correlated with a 
greater likelihood of success. King et al., supra note 2, at 10. 
30 See infra notes 32–56 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 57–130 and accompanying text. 
32 See Martin H. Redish & Colleen McNamara, Habeas Corpus, Due Process and the Suspen-
sion Clause: A Study in the Foundations of American Constitutionalism, 96 Va. L. Rev. 1361, 1362 
(2010); infra note 211 and accompanying text (describing the writ’s English roots); see also 
Clarke D. Forsythe, The Historical Origins of Broad Federal Habeas Review Reconsidered, 70 
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1079, 1080 (1995) (explaining that “[t]he writ is deeply based in the 
English common law”). 
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the Constitution prohibits suspending the “great writ,”33 the Supreme 
Court has given Congress wide latitude in defining the writ’s scope.34 
Congress exercised this power in 1996 by enacting AEDPA, which sig-
nificantly restricts the ability of state prisoners to obtain federal habeas 
relief.35 Fifteen years later, AEDPA has proven to be as confusing36 as it 
is controversial, prompting dozens of Supreme Court cases (including, 
of course, the topic of this Article) interpreting it37 and a vast number 
                                                                                                                      
 
33 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
34 See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996) (“[W]e have . . . recognized that 
judgments about the proper scope of the writ are ‘normally for Congress to make.’” (quot-
ing Lonchar v. Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996))). 
35 See Lee Kovarsky, AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism, 82 Tul. L. Rev. 443, 
470 (2007) (observing that “AEDPA’s provisions express a ‘general purpose’ to restrict the 
writ,” but arguing that courts should not read beyond the text of the statute to expand 
those restrictions); Eve Brensike Primus, A Structural Vision of Habeas Corpus, 98 Calif. L. 
Rev. 1, 10–11 (2010) (describing AEDPA’s many restrictions on habeas relief for state pris-
oners). 
36 Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943–44 (2007) (describing a phrase in § 2244 
as “not self-defining,” and interpreting that phrase by looking beyond AEDPA’s text in 
order to avoid “distortions and inefficiencies”); Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336 (1997) 
(observing that “the Act is not a silk purse of the art of statutory drafting”); Lee Kovarsky, 
Original Habeas Redux, 97 Va. L. Rev. 61, 80 (2011) (arguing that “AEDPA’s poor drafting is 
legendary” and citing to Panetti as an example of the Court avoiding a “formalistic applica-
tion” of AEDPA’s text (citing Panetti, 551 U.S. at 943–44)); Yackle, supra note 20, at 381 
(arguing that AEDPA is “not well drafted” and contains “extraordinarily arcane verbiage 
that will require considerable time and resources to sort out”). 
37 See, e.g., Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2560–63 (2010) (interpreting AEDPA’s 
statutory limitations period); Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473–75 (2007) (addressing 
federal courts’ discretion to grant an evidentiary hearing under AEDPA); Wiggins v. Smith, 
539 U.S. 510, 520–23 (2003) (interpreting the “unreasonable application” language of 
§ 2254(d)(1) in the Strickland context); Woodford v. Garceau, 538 U.S. 202, 204–08 (2003) 
(interpreting the Lindh rule for AEDPA’s application to pending cases in the capital context); 
Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 71–77 (2003) (interpreting the “unreasonable application 
of clearly established federal law” language in § 2254(d)(1)); Woodford v. Visciotti, 537 U.S. 
19, 22–27 (2002) (per curiam) (interpreting the “contrary to” and “unreasonable applica-
tion” clauses in the Strickland context); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 698–99 (2002) (interpret-
ing the “unreasonable application” clause in the Strickland context); Tyler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 
656, 662–68 (2001) (addressing successive petitions and retroactivity of a jury instruction rule 
under AEDPA); Penry v. Johnson, 532 U.S. 782, 792–93 (2001) (interpreting the “clearly 
established law” and “contrary to” clauses in § 2254(d)(1)); Ramdass v. Angelone, 530 U.S. 
156, 165–66 (2000) (applying the “unreasonable application” standard); Williams v. Taylor, 
529 U.S. 420, 429–35 (2000) (interpreting a petitioner’s required showings to obtain a fed-
eral evidentiary hearing under AEDPA); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 379–90 (2000) (in-
terpreting the “clearly established law” and “contrary to” requirements in § 2254(d)(1)); 
Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 641–46 (1998) (interpreting AEDPA’s restrictions 
on “second or successive petitions”); Lindh, 521 U.S. at 324–32 (interpreting AEDPA’s appli-
cation to cases pending when the Act became effective); Felker, 518 U.S. at 663–64 (address-
ing the constitutionality of AEDPA under the Suspension Clause); see also Allan Ides, Habeas 
Standards of Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1): A Commentary on Statutory Text and Supreme 
960 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:953 
of scholarly articles mostly decrying it.38 A brief account of the work-
ings of relevant portions of AEDPA will provide the context for a dis-
cussion of Pinholster.39 
                                                                                                                     
 Under AEDPA, a federal court may consider granting habeas relief 
to an individual in state custody under very limited circumstances. 
When a state court has adjudicated a petitioner’s claim on the merits 
(as the great majority of claims have been),40 a federal court may grant 
habeas relief only if the state court adjudication either (1) “resulted in 
a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme 
Court of the United States,”41 or (2) involved an “unreasonable deter-
mination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceeding.”42 Satisfaction of either § 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2) is 
necessary, but not sufficient, for habeas relief:43 a petitioner who clears 
one of these hurdles must still show that he is “in custody in violation of 
the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”44 (as must all 
federal habeas petitioners). 
 
 
Court Precedent, 60 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 677, 679–80 (2003) (citing thirteen Supreme Court 
AEPDA cases through the October 2002 term). 
38 See Marceau, supra note 19, at 4 (citing to the many “academic attacks” on AEDPA); 
see also, e.g., Larry W. Yackle, State Convicts and Federal Courts: Reopening the Habeas Corpus 
Debate, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 541, 542, 547 (2006) (arguing that AEDPA “manufactured” 
procedural problems). 
39 Professor Larry Yackle has provided more detailed accounts. See generally Larry W. 
Yackle, Explaining Habeas Corpus, 60 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 991 (1985) (explaining that before 
AEDPA, the writ was necessary to enforce federal rights, which were unpopular in many 
states); Yackle, supra note 20 (arguing, shortly after AEDPA’s passage, that § 2254(d) did 
not require deference to reasonable state court decisions on questions of federal law or 
mixed questions of law and fact). 
40 The majority of circuit courts interpret any substantive decision of a state court, or any 
substantive decision that describes the federal law on which it relies, to be an adjudication on 
the merits. See Margery I. Miller, Note, A Different View of Habeas: Interpreting AEDPA’s “Adjudi-
cated on the Merits” Clause When Habeas Corpus Is Understood as an Appellate Function of the Federal 
Courts, 72 Fordham L. Rev. 2593, 2615 (2004). 
41 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2006). 
42 Id. § 2254(d)(2). 
43 See Jackson v. McKee, 525 F.3d 430, 438 (6th Cir. 2008) (agreeing with the State’s ar-
gument that “§ 2254(d)(1) is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for habeas re-
lief”). 
44 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); cf. Jackson, 525 F.3d at 438 (“Even if he could meet the ‘unrea-
sonable application’ requirement set forth in § 2254(d)(1), Jackson needs more. Section 
2254(a) independently limits habeas relief to situations where a person ‘is in custody in 
violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States . . . .’”); Ballinger v. 
Prelesnik, No. 2:09-CV-13886, 2011 WL 5216277, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 2, 2011) (“It is 
usually the case that where a state court unreasonably rejects a constitutional claim it can 
also be immediately determined that the constitutional right was violated. But this is not 
always true.”). AEDPA also does not remove preexisting limitations on the availability of 
2012] Habeas After Pinholster 961 
 AEDPA, in addition to narrowing the types of state court errors for 
which federal relief is potentially available, also limits federal fact devel-
opment in habeas cases. First, a federal court must presume that facts 
found by a state court are correct,45 although some courts and com-
mentators have suggested that this presumption of correctness is weak-
ened if the state court decision is held unreasonable under either 
§ 2254(d)(1) or (d)(2).46 Further, with narrow exceptions, § 2254(e)(2) 
bars federal courts from holding evidentiary hearings on claims for 
which the petitioner did not establish a factual basis in state court.47 
                                                                                                                      
 
relief. See Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. Cal. L. 
Rev. 1125, 1159–60 (2005) (explaining that “[a]lthough the statutory language in 28 
U.S.C. § 2254 purports to encompass any claim that the petitioner’s custody is ‘in violation 
of the Constitution or laws . . . of the United States,’” courts exclude from these claims 
alleged Fourth Amendment violations addressed in a “full and fair” proceeding and laws of 
“federal constitutional criminal procedure” decided after the conclusion of the direct ap-
peal). 
45 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). 
46 See Justin F. Marceau, Deference and Doubt: The Interaction of AEDPA § 2254(d)(2) and 
(e)(1), 82 Tul. L. Rev. 385, 423–41 (2007) (describing the split among federal courts’ inter-
pretations of § 2254(d)(2) and § 2254(e)(1); reviewing the statutory structure, legislative 
history, and pre-AEDPA practice regarding factual deference; and concluding that (1) “state 
findings still must comport with minimum standards of procedural regularity, and extrinsic 
evidence may be considered by a federal court in assessing whether a state’s finding of fact 
might be rebutted,” and that (2) in light of the independent textual provision § 2254(e)(1), 
courts should not read § 2254(d)(2) to require deference to facts developed from deficient 
proceedings because such a reading would effectively erase § 2254(e)(1)). Alternatively, oth-
ers have argued that § 2254(e)(1)’s presumption that state factfinding is correct does not 
apply in cases “in which the only evidence is the evidence presented in state court,” but ra-
ther “is reserved for cases in which additional evidence is developed in federal habeas pro-
ceedings.” See Brief for the ACLU and the ACLU of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 3, Wood v. Allen, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010) (No. 08-9156). In Wood, the Supreme 
Court found no unreasonable determination of the facts but explicitly avoided the question 
of whether § 2254(e)(1) always applies in the § 2254(d)(2) analysis. 130 S. Ct. at 845; see also 
infra note 161 (further explaining the holding in Wood). Another argument is that the 
§ 2254(e)(1) presumption does not apply in cases “in which the only evidence is the evidence 
presented in state court.” See Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999–1000 (9th Cir. 2004) (in-
terpreting § 2254(e)(1) to apply when there is “new evidence presented for the first time in 
federal court” and § 2254(d)(2) to apply “most readily to situations where petitioner chal-
lenges the state court’s findings based entirely on the state record”). But see Rountree v. 
Balicki, 640 F.3d 530, 537–38 (3d Cir. 2011) (finding, in a case limited to the record before 
the state court, that “[t]he test for § 2254(d)(2)’s ‘unreasonable determination of facts’ 
clause is whether the petitioner has demonstrated by ‘clear and convincing evidence,’ 
§ 2254(e)(1), that the state court’s determination of the facts was unreasonable in light of 
the record”), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 533 (2011). 
47 If a petitioner has “failed to develop the factual basis of a claim” in state court, the fed-
eral habeas court may only hold a federal evidentiary hearing on that claim if a new, retroac-
tively applied rule of constitutional law has developed since the state court proceeding, 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(i), or if there exists newly discovered evidence that “could not have 
been previously discovered through the exercise of due diligence,” id. § 2254(e)(2)(A)(ii). In 
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 For factual bases that a petitioner has developed below, the 
§ 2254(e)(2) bar does not apply,48 leaving the decision to grant an evi-
dentiary hearing to “the sound discretion of district courts.”49 As the 
Court explained in Schriro v. Landrigan in 2007, however, this discretion 
is sharply limited by the requirements of § 2254(d): because courts 
must determine whether a hearing could lead to relief, they must con-
sider “the deferential standards prescribed by § 2254 . . . in deciding 
whether an evidentiary hearing is appropriate.”50 Thus, according to 
Schriro, “if the record refutes the applicant’s factual allegations or oth-
erwise precludes habeas relief, a district court is not required to hold 
an evidentiary hearing.”51 Although the Court did not address the issue 
directly, the same reasoning presumably applies to other ways of ex-
panding the factual record in federal habeas cases, which under the 
habeas rules include discovery and record supplementation for good 
cause.52 
 Despite this limitation on federal fact development, the circuit 
courts continued to unanimously hold after Schriro (as they had since 
the adoption of AEDPA) that federal courts could consider evidence 
developed at the federal level—through exhibits attached to the peti-
tion, evidentiary hearings, discovery, or record supplementation—to 
determine whether § 2254(d)(1) had been satisfied.53 They based this 
                                                                                                                      
 
addition to satisfying either of the above requirements, the facts must meet a demanding 
materiality standard. See id. § 2254(e)(2)(B). To establish materiality, the petitioner must 
show that “the facts underlying the claim would be sufficient to establish by clear and con-
vincing evidence that but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found 
the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.” Id. 
48 Williams, 529 U.S. at 430 (“By the terms of its opening clause [§ 2254(e)(2)] applies 
only to prisoners who have ‘failed to develop the factual basis of a claim in State court 
proceedings.’”); Fullwood v. Lee, 290 F.3d 663, 688 (4th Cir. 2002) (“Because [the peti-
tioner] did not ‘fail[] to develop’ the factual basis of this claim, section 2254(e)(2) pre-
sents no bar to an evidentiary hearing in district court.” (second alteration in original)). 
49 Schriro, 550 U.S. at 473 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 8(a) (2006)) (stating that “the 
judge must review the answer [and] any transcripts and records of state-court proceedings 
. . . to determine whether an evidentiary hearing is warranted”). 
50 Id. at 474. 
51 Id. 
52 Under the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, 
a judge may choose to allow discovery (for good cause) and supplementation of the fed-
eral record, including, inter alia, the use of interrogatories. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 6 (2006) 
(allowing discovery); id. Rule 7 (allowing the record to be supplemented). Throughout 
this Article, “fact development,” as used to describe a state or federal court process, refers 
to courts conducting evidentiary hearings and/or allowing discovery and record supple-
mentation. 
53 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (noting that, prior to Pin-
holster, circuit courts had taken two approaches to applying § 2254(d)(1), both of which 
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conclusion, in part, on AEDPA’s language; although § 2254(d)(2) al-
lowed a federal grant of habeas relief only if a state adjudication in-
volved an unreasonable determination of the facts “in light of the evi-
dence presented in the State court proceeding,” § 2254(d)(1) did not 
include similar language.54 Lower courts accordingly believed that they 
could conduct new fact development when deciding whether a state 
court decision was unreasonable or contrary to clearly established fed-
eral law, even if they did not always choose to allow in new evidence.55 
Pinholster changed the rules, however, by barring federal courts from 
considering any new evidence when determining whether § 2254(d)(1) 
is satisfied.56 
B. Pinholster’s Modification of the Habeas Landscape 
1. The Pinholster Decision 
  In 1982, California police arrested Scott Lynn Pinholster, and the 
State charged him with first-degree murder for burglarizing a house 
and fatally stabbing two people.57 A jury found Pinholster guilty, and 
during the penalty phase of the trial, Pinholster’s appointed attorneys 
only called one witness—Pinholster’s mother—despite having earlier 
consulted with a psychiatrist about Pinholster’s mental state at the time 
of the murder.58 The jury sentenced Pinholster to death on each of the 
two murder counts.59 Represented by new counsel, Pinholster filed an 
                                                                                                                      
allowed new evidence to be considered, and concluding that the majority’s approach of 
barring evidence outside of the state record “charts a third, novel course that, so far as I 
am aware, no court of appeals has adopted”); Ridgeway v. Zon, 424 F. App’x 58, 59–60 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (explaining the fact-development approach that the court would have taken 
pre-Pinholster); infra note 98 (listing cases contrasting the pre-Pinholster approach, under 
which federal courts had collected a range of new evidence, with the post-Pinholster ap-
proach of prohibiting new evidence). 
54 Cf. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1415–16 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d)(2)). 
55 It is unclear exactly how often federal courts conducted evidentiary hearings or oth-
erwise considered evidence outside the state-court record prior to Pinholster. Numerous 
courts, however, have noted the existence of federal evidence admitted prior to Pinholster 
that they could no longer consider in their § 2254(d) determinations following Pinholster. 
See infra note 98. 
56 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 & n.7 (placing an apparently categorical bar on a fed-
eral court’s consideration of any evidence beyond the state record until a petitioner has 
satisfied § 2254(d)(1) and, impliedly, § 2254(d)(2)). 
57 Id. at 1394–95. 
58 Id. at 1395–96. 
59 Id. at 1396. 
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unsuccessful habeas petition in state court.60 In this petition, Pinholster 
alleged, among other things, that his penalty-phase counsel had been 
ineffective in failing to “adequately investigate and present mitigating 
evidence, including evidence of mental disorders.”61 Pinholster’s new 
counsel introduced evidence of Pinholster’s mental problems from var-
ious records, a new psychiatrist, and family members.62 
 In his subsequent federal habeas petition, Pinholster alleged for 
the first time that his penalty-phase counsel had failed to give adequate 
background information to the original psychiatrist consulted prior to 
the penalty phase.63 Pinholster included a declaration from the original 
psychiatrist indicating that, had the psychiatrist received more back-
ground information, he would have looked more closely into Pinhol-
ster’s personality problems.64 Because Pinholster had not provided this 
declaration to the state court, the federal court held his petition in 
abeyance.65 Pinholster then filed a second habeas petition in state 
court—now including the original psychiatrist’s declaration.66 The 
court denied this petition on the merits.67 Pinholster then returned to 
                                                                                                                      
60 Id. 
61 Id. The quotations are the words of the Court, not the words of Pinholster’s habeas 
attorney. 
62 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1396. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. The court held his petition in abeyance because it contained both exhausted and 
unexhausted claims. See Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982). In 1982 in Rose v. Lundy, 
the Supreme Court held that “a district court must dismiss habeas petitions containing 
both unexhausted and exhausted claims.” Id. This dismissal allows the petitioner to litigate 
the claims in state court and return to federal court, provided that the petitioner satisfies 
AEDPA’s statute of limitations. See infra note 179 and accompanying text. The Supreme 
Court “has endorsed” this stay and abeyance in lieu of dismissal in cases where AEDPA’s 
statute of limitations would bar the petitioner’s claim. Randy Hertz & James S. Liebman, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 23.1 & n.16 (6th ed. 2011). This 
remedy, however, offers little practical recourse for petitioners. See Hoffstadt, supra note 
44, at 1161–63. As Professor Brian Hoffstadt explains, petitioners who “return to state 
court to file a state habeas petition seeking to exhaust the unexhausted claims” encounter 
two hurdles. Id. First, states bar “piecemeal challenges” and will refuse to hear the claim—
meaning that the petitioner has “exhausted” the claim by raising it and obtaining a deci-
sion (in this case, a denial of the claim) in state court. Id. at 1161–62. Second, the state’s 
refusal to hear the piecemeal claim is based on a procedural rule, and claims that states 
deny for procedural reasons are considered procedurally defaulted and cannot generally 
be addressed in federal habeas proceedings. Id. at 1162–63 (citing Edwards v. Carpenter, 
529 U.S. 446, 451 (2000); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 84 (1977)). Here, though, the 
California court rejected Pinholster’s second petition on the merits. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 
1396–97. 
66 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1396–97. 
67 Id. 
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the federal district court, which granted his request for an evidentiary 
hearing.68 
 At the hearing, Pinholster presented mitigation evidence that his 
counsel had not presented at the penalty phase.69 This evidence in-
cluded, among other items, testimony that his “biological father was an 
unemployed drunk” who “had mood swings and fits of anger, and was 
eventually diagnosed as paranoid with narcissistic personality disorder”; 
that Pinholster’s stepfather beat him “with his fists, a belt, and—on at 
least one occasion—a two-by-four board”; that “[a]fter Pinholster had 
been arrested three different times when he was ten or eleven years 
old, the juvenile court placed him in a home for emotionally disturbed 
boys, after which he stayed at a state mental hospital for about five 
months”; that “[h]is older brother, Alvin, was charged with the rape 
and sodomy of a fourteen-year-old, and was later diagnosed with schiz-
ophrenia and found to be incompetent to stand trial” and ultimately 
committed suicide; and that Pinholster “had suffered brain damage 
that explained his aggressive, impulsive, and antisocial behavior.”70 A 
psychiatrist diagnosed Pinholster with organic personality disorder 
“brought on by childhood and later-life head trauma.”71 
 Following the hearing, the district court granted habeas relief on 
the grounds of “inadequacy of defense counsel in investigating and pre-
senting mitigation evidence at the penalty phase.”72 An en banc panel of 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ultimately affirmed the district 
court’s grant of habeas relief, holding that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2), 
which bars new evidence in federal habeas except in certain circum-
stances, did not bar the district court’s evidentiary hearing, and that the 
court of appeals could consider the evidence from that hearing in de-
ciding whether the state had unreasonably applied federal law under 
§ 2254(d)(1).73 Chief Judge Alex Kozinski, joined by two others, dis-
sented, arguing that evidence from the federal hearing could not be 
considered because Pinholster was not diligent in developing the factual 
record in the state courts as required by § 2254(e)(2).74 
 The Supreme Court granted certiorari and addressed two issues: 
what evidence federal courts are allowed to consider in a § 2254(d)(1) 
                                                                                                                      
68 Id. at 1397. 
69 Pinholster v. Ayers, 590 F.3d 651, 660 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 660–61. 
72 Id. at 661. 
73 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1397. 
74 Ayers, 590 F.3d at 688–91 (Kozinski, C.J., dissenting). 
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review, and whether Pinholster should have been granted habeas re-
lief.75 Its decision on the first issue, the focus of this Article, fundamen-
tally changed AEDPA.76 
 In addressing what evidence a federal court may consider when 
making a relief prerequisite determination under § 2254(d)(1), Justice 
Thomas, writing for six other Justices in this part of the opinion, looked 
to “the broader context of [AEDPA] as a whole.”77 The Court deter-
mined that, because AEDPA requires petitioners to exhaust state reme-
dies “before filing for federal habeas relief,” and because § 2254(d)(1) 
refers to the past, “review under § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the record 
that was before the state court that adjudicated the claim on the mer-
its.”78 “It would be strange,” the Court concluded, “to ask federal courts 
to analyze whether a state court’s adjudication resulted in a decision 
that unreasonably applied federal law to facts not before the state 
court.”79 
 The Court rejected the argument that its decision renders 
§ 2254(e)(2)’s restrictions on evidentiary hearings superfluous, noting 
that, “[a]t a minimum,” that section will still limit hearings on claims 
not adjudicated on the merits in state court.80 Finally, Justice Thomas 
concluded, “AEDPA’s statutory scheme is designed to strongly discour-
age” state prisoners from submitting new evidence in federal court.81 
“Provisions like § 2254(d)(1) and (e)(2) ensure that federal courts sit-
ting in habeas are not an alternative forum for trying facts and issues 
which a prisoner made insufficient effort to pursue in state proceed-
ings.”82 Having concluded that the evidence presented at the federal 
evidentiary hearing could not be considered under § 2254(d)(1), the 
Court, split five to four on this issue, reversed the grant of habeas relief, 
emphasizing the “doubly deferential” review required under Strickland 
and AEDPA.83 
                                                                                                                      
75 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398. 
76 Compare supra notes 32–55 and accompanying text (describing the habeas system 
under AEDPA), with infra notes 95–130 and accompanying text (explaining how Pinholster 
altered this system). 
77 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398, 1413. 
78 Id. at 1398–99. 
79 Id. at 1399. 
80 Id. at 1401. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
83 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 
(1984)). 
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 Justice Sotomayor, writing for herself alone in this portion of her 
dissent (but with the substantial agreement of, perhaps surprisingly, 
Justice Alito),84 disagreed on a number of grounds.85 First, she empha-
sized the rarity of evidentiary hearings and the many hurdles that peti-
tioners must clear in order to obtain one.86 Arguing from the text of 
the statute, Justice Sotomayor then noted that only “§ 2254(d)(2)— 
unlike § 2254(d)(1)—expressly directs district courts to base their re-
view on ‘the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’”87 She 
then argued that the Court’s recognition “that some diligent habeas 
petitioners are unable to develop all of the facts supporting their claims 
in state court” was consistent with allowing new evidence to play a role 
in the § 2254(d)(1) determination.88 
 Perhaps most importantly, Justice Sotomayor observed that the 
Court’s new rule appears to create an “anomaly,” providing the exam-
ple of a petitioner who discovered evidence of a state’s withholding of 
exculpatory evidence following the close of a state hearing: 
[I]f the petitioner had not presented his Brady claim to the 
state court at all, his claim would be deemed defaulted and 
the petitioner could attempt to show cause and prejudice to 
overcome the default. If, however, the new evidence merely 
bolsters a Brady claim that was adjudicated on the merits in 
state court, it is unclear how the petitioner can obtain federal 
habeas relief after today’s holding. What may have been a rea-
sonable decision on the state-court record may no longer be 
reasonable in light of the new evidence. Because the state 
court adjudicated the petitioner’s Brady claim on the merits, 
§ 2254(d)(1) would still apply. Yet, under the majority’s inter-
pretation of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court is now prohibited 
                                                                                                                      
84 Id. at 1411 (Alito, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Al-
though I concur in the Court’s judgment, I agree with the conclusion reached in Part I of 
the dissent, namely, that, when an evidentiary hearing is properly held in federal court, 
review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) must take into account the evidence admitted at that 
hearing. As the dissent points out, refusing to consider the evidence received in the hear-
ing in federal court gives § 2254(e)(2) an implausibly narrow scope and will lead either to 
results that Congress surely did not intend or to the distortion of other provisions of 
[AEDPA] and the law on ‘cause and prejudice.’” (citation omitted)). 
85 See id. at 1413–21 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 1413–14 (citing King et al., supra note 2, at 35–36). 
87 Id. at 1415 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006)). 
88 Id. at 1416–17. 
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from considering the new evidence in determining the rea-
sonableness of the state-court decision.89 
This hypothetical example leads to the “anomalous result” that peti-
tioners who failed to raise a claim in state court, and who later obtain 
new evidence and raise a new claim based on this evidence, will be re-
warded with a federal hearing and habeas relief “if they can show cause 
and prejudice for their default.”90 Those who have been diligent in rais-
ing a claim and later obtain new evidence supporting the claim, on the 
other hand, will not typically have a “new claim” —only new evidence. 
Under Pinholster, these petitioners are barred from federal factfinding 
and relief.91 As Justice Sotomayor notes, “The majority responds to this 
anomaly by suggesting that my hypothetical petitioner ‘may well [have] 
a new claim,’”92 but, as discussed in more detail in Section II.C, this 
new claim often may not exist.93 
                                                                                                                     
2. Pinholster’s Immediate Impact in the Lower Courts 
 Before Pinholster, federal courts reviewing state court adjudications 
under AEDPA’s § 2254(d)(1) assumed that they could—within the con-
straints of § 2254(e)(2), the habeas rules, and Schriro—collect new evi-
dence94 to assess the reasonableness of the state court’s interpretation 
of federal law. After Pinholster, the evidence available to a reviewing 
court considering whether § 2254(d)(1) is satisfied—and thus, in many 
cases, whether habeas relief may be available—is considerably nar-
rowed.95 Indeed, as lower courts have already recognized, although 
Pinholster itself involved evidence from an evidentiary hearing, its rea-
soning clearly precludes federal courts from considering new evidence 
from any source, such as federal discovery, when conducting a 
§ 2254(d)(1) analysis.96 Not surprisingly, then, Pinholster has had a swift 
 
 
89 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1418 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. (second alteration in original). 
93 See infra notes 174–203 and accompanying text. 
94 See, e.g., Ridgeway, 424 F. App’x at 59–60 (describing the court’s ordinary course of 
action prior to Pinholster). 
95 See supra notes 75–83 and accompanying text (explaining the Pinholster majority’s 
reasoning). 
96 See, e.g., Champ v. Zavaras, 431 F. App’x 641, 655 (10th Cir. 2011) (“Although [Pin-
holster] dealt with new evidence that the district court admitted in the context of an eviden-
tiary hearing, this newly articulated rule applies with equal force to any expansion of the 
record under Habeas Rule 7.”); Teleguz v. Kelly, No. 7:10CV00254, 2011 WL 3319885, at *9 
(W.D. Va. Aug. 1, 2011) (concluding that Pinholster “significantly restricts my review of [pe-
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impact: immediately, federal courts, citing Pinholster, refused to hold 
evidentiary hearings97 and ignored evidence collected by federal courts 
prior to Pinholster.98 
                                                                                                                      
 
titioner’s] current claims,” by prohibiting the court from reviewing de novo “newly ob-
tained evidence [presented by petitioner to the district court] bolstering claims previously 
adjudicated before the state court”); Hertz & Liebman, supra note 65, § 20.2 n.21 (“Al-
though section 2254(e)(2) is framed in terms of evidence that the petitioner seeks to in-
troduce in federal court by means of ‘an evidentiary hearing,’ the provision applies equally 
to new evidence that a petitioner seeks to introduce in federal court in documentary form, 
for example, by moving to expand the record.” (citing Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649, 
653 (2004) (per curiam) (finding that § 2254(e)(2) applies “a fortiori when a prisoner 
seeks relief based on new evidence without an evidentiary hearing”))); cf. Elmore v. Oz-
mint, 661 F.3d 783, 850–52 (4th Cir. 2011) (noting that “[b]y its plain terms, § 2254(d)(2) 
limits our review to the evidence placed before the state [postconviction relief (PCR)] 
court” and that “Cullen v. Pinholster precludes our consideration of evidence developed 
subsequent to [state PCR court orders], including later-developed evidence that the par-
ties have urged us to take into account,” but nonetheless grants relief based on the state-
court record). But see Hasan v. Ishee, No. 1:03-cv-288, 2011 WL 5596891, at *7 n.6 (S.D. 
Ohio Nov. 17, 2011) (concluding, in an order granting petitioner leave to obtain limited 
discovery on claims adjudicated on the merits, that “[Pinholster] does not bar discovery on 
the claim because the decision ‘did not, strictly speaking, alter or even speak to the stan-
dards governing discovery set forth in Rule 6 of the [Habeas Rules] and Bracy v. Gramley’” 
(alteration in original) (quoting Conway v. Houk, No. 2:07-cv-947, 2011 WL 2119373, at *3 
(S.D. Ohio May 26, 2011))); Ervin v. Cullen, No. C 00-01228 CW, 2011 WL 4005389, at *3 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 8, 2011) (granting discovery despite Pinholster, listing cases in which 
“courts have relied on [Pinholster] to limit discovery in connection with petitions for ha-
beas relief” (including one § 2254(e)(2) case), and noting that “[t]hese decisions are not 
controlling”). 
97 A number of federal courts refused to hold evidentiary hearings or conduct discov-
ery in light of Pinholster. See, e.g., Champ, 431 F. App’x at 655; Atkins v. Clarke, 642 F.3d 47, 
49 (1st Cir. 2011); Wilson v. Humphrey, No. 5:10-CV-489 (MTT), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
74447, at *9–11 (M.D. Ga. July 12, 2011) (refusing to grant a discovery request without 
reaching the issue of “whether Pinholster further limits discovery in § 2254 proceedings”); 
Nam Riofta v. Pacholke, No. C07-5489 BHS/KLS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55911, at *7 (W.D. 
Wash. May 23, 2011) (denying additional discovery); Pate v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 6:08-
cv-2079-Orl-28KRS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54212, at *1–4 (M.D. Fla. May 20, 2011) (deny-
ing an evidentiary hearing); Sanders v. Curtin, No. 2:08-CV-14448, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
49094, at *33–34 (E.D. Mich. May 9, 2011) (denying an evidentiary hearing); Parrish v. 
Simpson, No. 3:09CV-254-H, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45551, at *9 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 27, 2011) 
(denying a hearing and discovery “because the Court would not be able to consider any-
thing beyond the state-court record”); Trimble v. Bobby, No. 5:10-CV-00149, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 42165, at *7–8 (N.D. Ohio Apr. 19, 2011) (denying a request for new evidence in 
the form of conducting a PET scan—a test repeatedly denied in state courts and thus rare-
ly conducted or included within the state record, see O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the 
“Complexity” of Capital Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1265, 1292–93 & nn.136–37 (2007)). 
But see Bemore v. Martel, No. 08cv0311 LAB (WVG), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72296, at *5–8 
(S.D. Cal. July 6, 2011) (conducting an evidentiary hearing because, under § 2254(e)(2), 
petitioner had not failed to diligently develop facts underlying his claims in state court; but 
noting that it would only be able to consider new facts from the hearing if “Petitioner first 
satisfies section 2254(d)” (emphasis omitted)); cf. Ballinger, 2011 WL 5216277, at *1 (deny-
ing a motion for reconsideration of the court’s decision to grant an evidentiary hearing 
970 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:953 
 In one stark example from the Second Circuit, Russell Ridgeway 
raised a Strickland ineffective assistance of counsel claim in his federal 
district court habeas petition, alleging that his attorney was ineffective 
for two reasons.99 First, the attorney did not call a medical expert who 
would have rebutted the prosecution’s claims about the only physical 
evidence of sexual abuse available in the case; second, the attorney 
failed to call Ridgeway’s mother and sisters who would have testified 
about Ridgeway’s relationship with the alleged sexual abuse victim.100 
The court of appeals, addressing petitioner’s appeal from the district 
court’s denial of relief, noted that the state record was “sparse, to say 
                                                                                                                      
because it had “already determined that [§] 2254(d)’s hurdle has been cleared” and now 
was considering whether petitioner was being unconstitutionally held under [§] 2254(a)); 
Love v. Cate, Nos. 10 55377, 10 55387, 2011 WL 3874873, at *4 n.1 (9th Cir. Aug. 21, 2011) 
(Graber, J., dissenting) (noting that, where a court already has found an unreasonable 
application of federal law, a federal court may hold an evidentiary hearing to determine 
whether a prosecutor’s peremptory strike was racially motivated). Some courts vacated 
their own orders to conduct additional factfinding. See Johnson v. Walker, No. 2: 09-cv-0067 
WBS KJN P, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46808, at *9–11 (E.D. Cal. May 2, 2011) (vacating an 
order for further briefing); United States ex rel. Brady v. Hardy, No. 10 C 2098, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44570, at *4–5 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2011) (vacating the court’s prior decision to 
hold an evidentiary hearing). 
98 Some federal courts, in light of Pinholster, ignored evidence collected in federal 
court prior to Pinholster and/or halted federal factfinding. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kelly, 650 
F.3d 477, 492 (4th Cir. 2011) (relying only on the state-court record despite new evidence 
from an evidentiary hearing conducted in federal district court), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 64 
(2011); Henness v. Bagley, 644 F.3d 308, 327 (6th Cir. 2011) (ignoring new evidence pre-
sented in district court); Price v. Thurmer, 637 F.3d 831, 837 (7th Cir. 2011) (ignoring 
evidence from a hearing conducted in the court of appeals but finding that, even if it 
could consider the evidence, petitioner would not have prevailed); Carter v. Bigelow, No. 
2:02-CV-326 TS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71551, at *6, *8–9 (D. Utah June 27, 2011) (halting 
federal discovery, finding that it would be futile and that the court could not consider any 
evidence unearthed); Hand v. Houk, No. 2:07-cv-846, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 69001, at *162 
(S.D. Ohio Apr. 25, 2011) (ignoring evidence from the court’s own evidentiary hearing 
because the “testimony should not have been admitted” under Pinholster); cf. Lee v. Al-
mager, No. CV 08-3248-PA(E), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78612, at *47–48 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 
2011) (finding that the court could only review the state record even though it previously 
ordered a hearing, which had not yet occurred). But see Carter v. Sec’y, Dep’t of Corr., No. 
6:09-cv-468-Orl-31KRS, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51924, at *1–8 (M.D. Fla. May 16, 2011) 
(granting the respondent’s motion to dispense with a previously granted evidentiary hear-
ing based on Pinholster, but nonetheless granting habeas relief on the state-court record); 
Beck v. Nooth, No. CV. 08-636-KI, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40976, at *20–21 (D. Or. Apr. 14, 
2011) (finding that the court had to ignore new evidence collected, but that habeas relief 
was nonetheless warranted “based upon the evidence before the state post-conviction 
court”). For cases that relied on federal evidentiary hearings and were vacated and re-
manded by the Supreme Court in light of Pinholster, see Ryan v. Schad, 131 S. Ct. 2092 
(2011) (mem.), vacating and remanding 606 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2010); Ryan v. Detrich, 131 
S. Ct. 2449 (2011) (mem.), vacating and remanding 619 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2010). 
99 Ridgeway, 424 F. App’x at 59. 
100 Id. 
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the least,” and “failed to establish conclusively that Ridgeway’s counsel 
had not consulted a medical expert or ignored Ridgeway’s request to 
call his relatives.”101 New evidence presented by Ridgeway in federal 
district court “appear[ed] to lend some credence to Ridgeway’s claims,” 
however, and the court of appeals noted that, “[a]s in other cases, we 
might have remanded the cause to give Ridgeway’s counsel an oppor-
tunity to explain behavior” that appeared to fall beneath Strickland’s 
minimum requirements for effective assistance.102 The Supreme Court 
had, however, decided Pinholster two days before oral argument in 
Ridgeway, and the court was forced to affirm.103 
 In the 2011 case Pape v. Thaler, the Fifth Circuit similarly reversed a 
district court’s decision to grant habeas relief on a Strickland ineffective 
assistance claim.104 The court first held that, under Pinholster, the district 
court had erred in conducting an evidentiary hearing and in using evi-
dence from this hearing to grant habeas relief under § 2254(d)(1).105 
The court of appeals then concluded that, “[b]ased on the record be-
fore us, the state court did not err by concluding that counsel had not 
acted deficiently.”106 In a similar case, Judge James Jones of the Western 
District of Virginia observed that Pinholster “instructs” the district court 
that it may not consider new evidence obtained after a state court adju-
dication—evidence that the court previously would have reviewed and 
that would have “bolster[ed] [petitioner’s] claims.”107 Judge Jones con-
cluded by noting that his “review of a state criminal case as a federal 
judge is exceedingly limited,” even in capital cases, and therefore de-
nied habeas relief.108 
 In the most stark examples of Pinholster’s impact, the new limita-
tion on § 2254(d) has required federal courts to ignore evidence they 
had already collected.109 In others, it has prevented federal courts from 
expanding the record in the first place—a problem that will persist.110 
For petitioners who have not been allowed to develop their claims in 
state court, this is a significant problem. 
                                                                                                                      
101 Id. at 59–60. 
102 Id. at 60 (citation omitted). 
103 Id. at 59–60. 
104 645 F.3d 281, 291 (5th Cir. 2011). 
105 Id. at 288. 
106 Id. at 291. 
107 Teleguz, 2011 WL 3319885, at *9. 
108 Id. at *45. 
109 See supra note 98. 
110 See supra note 97 (citing cases where courts have refused to hold evidentiary hear-
ings after Pinholster). 
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3. The Pinholster Problem 
 AEDPA’s rules for federal fact development, although restrictive, 
previously provided a limited remedy for deficiencies in state fact de-
velopment procedures. If a petitioner could not fully develop a record 
in state court he could introduce new evidence in some circumstances, 
and federal courts had discretion to conduct additional discovery, hold 
hearings, or supplement the record in determining whether a peti-
tioner had satisfied § 2254(d)(1). Pinholster removes these safeguards. 
 By closing off a primary route to fact development in federal ha-
beas review of state cases, Pinholster places an extraordinary premium on 
effective fact development at the state level. To clear the § 2254(d)(1) 
hurdle, petitioners must now rely solely on the state record unless they 
can show that their claim was not adjudicated on the merits below—an 
uncommon circumstance.111 This significantly exacerbates a known 
problem with AEDPA generally: AEDPA expanded the deference that 
federal courts must give to state court fact development and state courts’ 
interpretations of federal law while simultaneously removing the pre-
AEDPA requirement that state postconviction review hearings be “full 
and fair” before receiving deference.112 As Professor Larry Yackle pro-
phetically observed before AEDPA: 
Would-be federal habeas petitioners raising fact-sensitive 
claims are routinely diverted to state postconviction proceed-
ings in which the state courts can determine “factual” issues 
(broadly conceived) that will then be entitled to the statutory 
presumption [of correctness] when, and if, petitioners return 
to the federal forum. In the end, state postconviction reme-
dies serve as substitutes for federal habeas corpus in the adju-
dication of federal claims.113 
With a deficient factual record114 and no access to federal fact devel-
opment, many habeas petitioners will have little chance of success in 
                                                                                                                      
111 See supra note 40. 
112 See Yackle, supra note 17, at 140–41; see also Marceau, supra note 46, at 396–99 (de-
scribing some courts’ conclusions, which Marceau views as erroneous, that even unreason-
able determinations of facts by state courts must receive deference under § 2254(e)(1)). 
113 Larry W. Yackle, The Misadventures of State Postconviction Remedies, 16 N.Y.U. Rev. L. 
& Soc. Change 359, 377 (1988) (footnote omitted). 
114 Where state postconviction proceedings are robust, Pinholster may have little effect 
because federal courts—even following the pre-Pinholster standard—may see no need to 
supplement the state-court record. The frequency with which federal courts allowed in 
new evidence through discovery or hearings prior to Pinholster is difficult to pinpoint and 
has not yet been studied. 
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obtaining relief. As the concurrence in a post-Pinholster case from the 
Eleventh Circuit notes: 
Without the aid of legal process and a developed record to rely 
upon, it would be virtually impossible for any petitioner to car-
ry his or her ultimate burden of proof, let alone to demon-
strate that he or she is entitled to habeas relief in federal court 
under AEDPA’s “doubly deferential” standard of review.115 
 The problem with state records arises from the inability of habeas 
petitioners—the great majority without access to counsel116—to dis-
cover and document relevant facts in light of state courts’ often restric-
tive fact-development procedures.117 Professors from Cornell’s Death 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 Borden v. Allen, 646 F.3d 785, 831 (11th Cir. 2011) (Wilson, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part) (quoting Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1403). 
116 Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7, 10 (1989) (confirming that “neither the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment nor the equal protection guarantee of 
‘meaningful access’ require[s] the State to appoint counsel for indigent prisoners seeking 
state postconviction relief” and that this principle applies equally to capital and noncapital 
cases). But see Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State Capi-
tal Postconviction Proceedings, 91 Cornell L. Rev. 1079, 1080 (2006) (arguing that Giar-
ratano in fact supports a right to counsel in state postconviction review and should be aban-
doned). 
117 There is a dearth of empirical literature addressing fact-development deficiencies in 
state postconviction review proceedings. The literature tends to assume that state proceed-
ings are effective or deficient, with little empirical proof. Professors Joseph Hoffman and 
Nancy King, for example, in arguing for the elimination of habeas review of state convictions 
except in capital cases, “make no empirical claims about the effectiveness of present state 
appellate and postconviction review processes.” Hoffman & King, supra note 16, at 836. They 
assume, however, that state courts “will continue to provide a reasonable level of post-trial or 
post-plea judicial review of claims of constitutional error” in state postconviction review cas-
es—thus implying an assumption that state courts already provide this reasonable level of 
review. Id. at 836–37. Professor Yackle, on the other hand, argues that state proceedings are 
deficient. Yackle, supra note 38, at 556. Professor Yackle argues that state judges are “charged 
to see that federal procedural safeguards are respected. Yet their ability to do so is compro-
mised by the overriding mission to vindicate state criminal law” —an observation that he 
admits is an “exaggeration” but claims is a sound “general point.” Id. Professor Andrew 
Hammel, in contrast to Hoffman, King, and Yackle, emphasizes the difficulty of making ac-
curate assumptions about the quality of state postconviction processes: “For every habeas 
‘rogue state’ which subjects death row inmates to an inadequate or haphazard post-
conviction forum (and then seeks to enforce defaults in federal court caused by the deficien-
cies in its procedure), there are other states which demonstrate concern for fair post-
conviction procedures.” Andrew Hammel, Diabolical Federalism: A Functional Critique and Pro-
posed Reconstruction of Death Penalty Federal Habeas, 39 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1, 50 (2002). Hammel 
notes, however, that a study that he cites to support this proposition (an empirical review of 
error rates in capital cases between 1973 and 1995) used data that “were collected during the 
era of federally-funded resource centers and therefore probably reflect higher standards of 
advocacy than prevail today.” Id. at 51 n.333 (citing James S. Liebman et al., Capital Attrition: 
Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973–1995, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1839, 1848 (2000)). Hammel believes 
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Penalty Project have concluded that “many prisoners cannot secure a 
state court hearing or preserve their right to further review,” pointing 
primarily to the problem of limited resources.118 And even where coun-
sel or pro se litigants make diligent efforts to develop the record, 
elected judges may be loath “to authorize funding for investigative or 
expert services, [or] to order production of evidence”119 in light of lim-
ited budgets and the fear of being labeled “soft” on crime. 
 Beyond the constraints posed by inadequate representation and 
expert services for petitioners, state courts’ post-trial procedures for 
fact development are limited. As thirty-one states defending their post-
conviction procedures recently noted, “[V]irtually every State provides 
for the summary disposition of post-conviction claims without a hear-
ing.”120 Although states often provide for postconviction hearings in 
limited circumstances,121 state courts often deny a hearing unless the 
                                                                                                                      
 
that in states like Georgia, where resource centers have lost their funding, the situation has 
“changed dramatically.” Id. 
118 See John H. Blume et al., In Defense of Noncapital Habeas: A Response to Hoffman and 
King, 96 Cornell L. Rev. 435, 447 (2011). Access to counsel, the quality of counsel, and 
the procedures afforded during postconviction review vary substantially among states. Cf. 
Casey C. Kannenberg, Wading Through the Morass of Modern Federal Habeas Review of State 
Capital Prisoners’ Claims, 28 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 107, 120–24 (2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 2261, 2265) (discussing AEDPA’s “opt-in” mechanism, which provides accelerated fed-
eral habeas review of state capital cases and removes ineffectiveness of counsel as a 
grounds for relief if states meet certain requirements for providing competent postconvic-
tion counsel, and noting that only Arizona met the opt-in requirements); Alissa Pollitz 
Worden et al., A Patchwork of Policies: Justice, Due Process, and Public Defense Across American 
States, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1423, 1434 (2011) (noting that the “system for providing counsel at 
[the appellate] stage varies among states, with some taking direct responsibility through 
the provision of defender services under the direct auspices of the state, while others dele-
gate the responsibility to counties”). 
119 Blume et al., supra note 118, at 446. 
120 Brief for State of Idaho and 30 Other States as Amici Curiae in Support of Respon-
dent at 5–6, Bell v. Kelly, 555 U.S. 55 (2008) (No. 07-1223), available at http://www.american 
bar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/preview/publiced_preview_briefs_pdfs_07_08_07_ 
1223_RespondentAmCuID30OtherStates.authcheckdam.pdf. 
121 For examples of states that provide for some type of postconviction hearing, see 725 
Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/122-6 (West 2008) (providing a hearing at the court’s discretion); 
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-1507 (West 2005) (providing a hearing “[u]nless the motion and the 
files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief”); 
La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 930 (2008) (providing a hearing for facts not otherwise 
resolved); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 590.04 (West 2010) (providing for introduction of affidavits, 
depositions, and oral testimony at the judge’s discretion); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 440.30 
(McKinney 2005) (requiring grant of a motion to vacate a judgment without a hearing if 
there is “unquestionable documentary proof” or “sworn allegations of fact . . . conceded by 
the people to be true” that support a “ground constituting legal basis for the motion”); 
N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1420(c)(1) (West 2011) (providing a hearing unless the court 
determines that the motion is without merit); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2953.21 (West 2006 
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petitioner crosses a high procedural hurdle, such as demonstrating that 
new evidence has been discovered that would more likely than not lead 
the court to overturn a conviction—typically a showing that “the pris-
oner lacks the wherewithal to make.”122 Other states offer “discovery” 
(which may potentially include a hearing) if petitioners have presented 
a prima facie case or cleared other initial barriers to factfinding.123 
When courts conduct a simple paper hearing124 or allow limited dis-
covery under these procedures, they may deny the admission of crucial 
affidavits, tests, or expert reports that the petitioner has managed to 
obtain.125 In many cases, a state court’s fact development procedures 
may be facially adequate, but even here, the deferential abuse-of-
discretion review for a lower court’s refusal to admit certain evidence in 
                                                                                                                      
& Supp. 2011) (providing a hearing “[u]nless the petition and the files and records of the 
case show the petition is not entitled to relief”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 138.620 (2011) (provid-
ing a hearing after the defendant responds to the petition); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 9545 (West 2007) (allowing petitioner to request an evidentiary hearing); R.I. Gen. Laws 
§ 10-9.1-7 (1997), http://www.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/TITLE10/10-9.1/10-9.1-7.HTM (pro-
viding a hearing “if deemed appropriate”); Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-30-110 (2011) (provid-
ing an evidentiary hearing if “the petition raises substantial questions of fact as to events in 
which the petitioner participated”); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 7133 (2009) (providing a 
“prompt hearing” “[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively 
show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief”); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 974.06 (West 2007) (tak-
ing the same approach as Vermont); Ala. R. Crim. P. 32.9 (providing a hearing “to deter-
mine disputed issues of material fact”); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.8 (providing a “hearing to 
determine issues of material fact”); Ark. R. Crim. P. 37.3 (providing a “prompt hearing 
with proceedings reported”); Colo. R. Crim. P. 35 (providing a postconviction hearing 
when a convict alleges the existence of “material facts, not theretofore presented and 
heard, which, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, could not have been known to or 
learned by the defendant or his attorney prior to the submission of the issues to the court 
or jury, and which requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of jus-
tice”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.851 (providing an evidentiary hearing). 
122 Blume et al., supra note 118, at 445–47. 
123 See, e.g., Alaska Stat. § 12.72.030 (2010); Mont. Code Ann. § 46-21-201 (2011) 
(allowing the “discovery procedures available in criminal or civil proceedings” upon a 
showing of good cause); Mass. R. Crim. P. 30 (allowing affidavits and discovery “[w]here 
affidavits filed by the moving party . . . establish a prima facie case for relief”). 
124 See, e.g., Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 29.15(i), http://www.courts.mo.gov/page.jsp?id=23 (fol-
low “court rules,” then “Rules of Criminal Procedure,” then “Rule 29,” then “Rule 29.15”) 
(providing that if a court orders a hearing, “the movant need not be present” and “[t]he 
court may order that testimony of the movant shall be received by deposition”); S.C. Code 
Ann. § 17-27-150 (2003) (allowing the “processes of discovery available under the South 
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure” for good cause and at the judge’s discretion). 
125 See, e.g., Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284, 1292 (10th Cir. 2009) (noting that the 
state appellate court relied solely on the record from trial in denying petitioner’s appeal, 
denying any opportunity for the petitioner to make a claim or to submit any affidavits or 
“other non-record evidence” to support this claim); infra note 283 and accompanying text 
(describing a state hearing limited to one affidavit prepared by counsel). 
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post-trial proceedings126—and the evidence allowed to be omitted un-
der this standard—provides little recourse for discretion not exercised 
in defendants’ favor.127 Prior to Pinholster, a petitioner saddled with a 
weak state record could often use evidence produced in federal court 
to overcome § 2254(d)(1): a showing that the petitioner had sought 
unsuccessfully to expand the record in state court often established that 
the petitioner had not “failed” to develop the factual basis for his claim 
under § 2254(e).128 By limiting the § 2254(d)(1) analysis to the state 
record and by removing the option to use § 2254(e) for a hearing, the 
Supreme Court has precluded this option. Although Justice Sotomayor 
assumed in her dissent that “the majority [did] not intend to suggest 
that review is limited to the state-court record when a petitioner’s in-
ability to develop the facts supporting his claim was the fault of the state 
court itself,”129 neither her dissent nor the Court’s opinion offers a 
clear roadmap to avoiding this outcome.130 
                                                                                                                      
 
126 I refer to “post-trial” procedures to describe state procedural requirements in pro-
ceedings that address challenges to the constitutionality of a criminal conviction. Although 
a defendant must raise some challenges at trial, in most states these challenges must be 
brought through appellate and/or postconviction collateral review procedures. 
127 Cf. People v. Stanaway, 521 N.W.2d 557, 575 (Mich. 1994) (“Criminal defendants do 
not have general rights to discovery.”); State v. Williams, 846 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Tex. App. 
1992) (“There is no general right under the United States Constitution to discovery by a 
defendant in a criminal case of evidence in possession of the State . . . .”). 
128 Moreover, a petitioner could allege additional facts in federal court as long as they 
did not “fundamentally alter” the claim. See Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986); 
Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277–78 (1971); Hertz & Liebman, supra note 65, 
§ 23.3(c)(ii)–(iii); 28 James W. Moore et al., Moore’s Federal Practice—Criminal 
Procedure § 671.06(3)(a)(i) & n.28 (3d ed. 2011). 
129 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
130 Justice Sotomayor’s assumption may not, however, be a safe one. Justice So-
tomayor’s Pinholster dissent cites to oral argument in Bell to support her assumption. Id. In 
that argument, however, Justice Scalia believed that states need not provide minimal proc-
ess to comport with the constitution—states could, for example, bar the introduction of 
new evidence. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 50, Bell, 555 U.S. 55 (No. 07-1223), avail-
able at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/07-1223.pdf. 
This is not particularly reassuring for petitioners because, as Justice Sotomayor points out, 
they now lack clear avenues to adequate fact development in state or federal court. Pinhol-
ster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 n.5 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing to Transcript of Oral Argu-
ment, supra). Justice Scalia and his interlocutor, an attorney defending state procedures, 
argued that defendants lacked this independent right. First, they reasoned, states need not 
offer any form of postconviction review, so they also need not provide minimal process as 
part of this review. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra, at 50–51. Justice Scalia, in question-
ing counsel, asked, “I guess the State court can say, you know, 60 days after the trial is—is 
doomsday. No more new evidence. . . . Suppose that’s unconstitutional—but it isn’t.” Id. at 
50. Counsel replied that such procedure would not be unconstitutional because “the State 
court—we don’t have to provide for direct appeals.” Id. Second, Justice Scalia suggested 
that if states were required to follow certain postconviction review procedures, federal 
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 By limiting review under § 2254(d) to the state level, Pinholster 
places even more emphasis on the state record. Petitioners who were 
unable to develop the facts supporting their claims in state court will 
employ alternative ways of overcoming this problem, both within and 
outside of AEDPA. In resolving these challenges—which, with Pinhol-
ster’s elimination of the federal backstop, will take on a new urgency— 
the Court will have to consider critical, unresolved questions surround-
ing AEDPA, the Suspension Clause, and postconviction due process. 
II. AEDPA and the Quality of State Postconviction Procedures 
 As petitioners attempt to cope with inadequate state fact develop-
ment after Pinholster, they have a variety of claims and arguments avail-
able. This Part addresses arguments based on the text of AEDPA itself; 
constitutional claims are considered in Part III. 
 Within AEDPA, the approaches with the greatest potential for ad-
dressing the problem are, at their core, efforts to read into the statute a 
procedural fairness prerequisite to affording deference to a state court 
decision—despite the fact that AEDPA eliminated the express proce-
dural prerequisites in its predecessor.131 This argument has a pedigree 
as old as AEDPA itself: in the year that AEDPA was enacted, Professor 
Yackle argued that although AEDPA “drop[ped] the specific proce-
dural and substantive standards contained in the former § 2254(d),” it 
did not “dispense with a federal court’s rudimentary responsibility to 
ensure that it is deciding a constitutional claim based on factual find-
ings that were forged in a procedurally adequate way and were an-
chored in a sufficient evidentiary record.”132 Although taken up by a 
number of circuit courts, the Supreme Court has not decided the issue. 
This omission is likely due in part to the role of federal fact develop-
                                                                                                                      
habeas courts would send new evidence claims back to the state before conducting AEDPA 
review; instead, federal courts address the new evidence themselves. Id. at 50–51. The 
Court has since soundly rejected these arguments, making it clear that defendants have a 
state-created liberty interest in minimal postconviction procedures, see Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 
2319, and a right to at least one full and fair adjudication of their constitutional claims. See 
Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779. Despite the rejection of this approach, Justice Scalia’s views on 
the matter suggest that he would not welcome an assumption that a deficient state pro-
ceeding need not receive deference. 
131 Yackle, supra note 17, at 140. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1994) (requiring federal 
courts to defer to state courts only when those courts made certain written findings), with 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) (omitting that requirement). 
132 Yackle, supra note 17, at 141; see also Marceau, supra note 19, at 9–20 (discussing 
what makes an adjudication “full and fair”); Marceau, supra note 46, at 427 (arguing that 
“it is generally acknowledged that AEDPA does not displace the whole of habeas law as it 
existed prior to 1996”). 
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ment in remedying the most egregious state procedural failures prior 
to Pinholster. The elimination of this safety valve will bring the issue to 
the forefront. 
 The most promising paths to finding a procedural prerequisite to 
deference are also marked in the literature,133 but must be reassessed 
in light of Pinholster. The Court’s decision foreclosed one previously 
viable approach—that § 2254(d)(1) does not apply when new material 
evidence is discovered in federal court134—and calls others into ques-
use of his fail-
ure to have the new claim addressed in the state court.138 
                                                                                                                     
tion. 
 After Pinholster, habeas petitioners have three plausible textual ar-
guments that AEDPA deference should not apply in the face of unfair 
state fact-development proceedings. First, when a state court’s proce-
dures are woefully deficient, the state court has arguably failed to adju-
dicate a claim on the merits.135 This approach removes the § 2254(d)(1) 
and (d)(2) barriers to relief, opening the door to federal fact develop-
ment, subject to § 2254(e)’s requirements.136 Second, a deficient fact 
development scheme could render state court factfindings procedurally 
“unreasonable,” satisfying § 2254(d)(2).137 Finally, as hinted in Pinholster 
itself, a petitioner could attempt to raise new claims on federal habeas 
review, pointing to the deficient state procedures as the ca
 
133 See Marceau, supra note 19, at 9–20. 
134 Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1400 (2011); see also Brown v. Smith, 551 F.3d 
424, 429 (6th Cir. 2008) (“We think that [AEDPA deference does not apply] whenever new, 
substantial evidence supporting a habeas claim comes to light during the proceedings in 
federal district court.”); Monroe v. Angelone, 323 F.3d 286, 297 (4th Cir. 2003) (“AEDPA’s 
deference requirement does not apply when a claim made on federal habeas review is 
premised on Brady material that has surfaced for the first time during federal proceed-
ings.”). 
135 For a discussion of the importance of identifying whether a court has addressed a 
claim on the merits, whether a claim is procedurally defaulted, or whether petitioner 
raised a claim but the state court failed to address it, see infra notes 177–187 and accom-
panying text. 
136 See infra note 142 and accompanying text; cf. Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330, 332 
(3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam) (noting that where a habeas case is adjudicated on the merits 
in state court, “federal habeas relief is subject to the standards prescribed by [AEDPA], 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)”). 
137 See infra notes 161–173 and accompanying text. Similarly, if a state court has adjudi-
cated the merits of the claim, deficient state procedures may violate due process or other 
constitutional rights, in which case the state court may have unreasonably applied or acted 
contrary to federal law, thus satisfying § 2254(d)(1). Part III of this Article discusses the 
due process question in the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) context; the due process analysis 
would be similar for a § 2254(d)(1) claim. See infra notes 204–282 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 174–194 and accompanying text. 
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A. Inadequate State Fact Development as a Failure to Adjudicate  
a Claim on the Merits 
 If a petitioner can persuade a federal habeas court that a claim was 
not “adjudicated on the merits” in state court, the petitioner can avoid 
Pinholster altogether.139 Pinholster only bars consideration of federally de-
veloped facts under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1),140 which applies only to 
claims adjudicated on the merits. Thus, when a state court has not adju-
dicated a claim on the merits, the federal court may therefore review the 
claim without according § 2254(d) deference,141 and its fact-develop-
                                                                                                                      
 
139 Cf. James v. Schriro, 659 F.3d 855, 876 (9th Cir. 2011) (determining that the court 
could consider new evidence presented in a federal evidentiary hearing in granting relief 
on a Strickland claim because a state postconviction court found that the claim was proce-
durally barred rather than adjudicated on the merits, and Pinholster allows consideration of 
such evidence subject to § 2254(e)’s requirements). This scenario differs from the scenar-
ios discussed in this Part, in which a petitioner might argue that claims addressed in a cur-
sory fashion by a state court or ignored entirely (rather than procedurally defaulted) were 
not adjudicated on the merits. 
140 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 (“If a claim has been adjudicated on the merits by a 
state court, a federal habeas petitioner must overcome the limitation of § 2254(d)(1) on 
the record that was before that state court.”). The Court’s reasoning, however, appears to 
also bar federal factfinding under § 2254(d)(2). In § 2254(d)(1), Congress simply provides 
(as summarized by the Court) that a federal habeas court is to review “a state-court adjudi-
cation that ‘resulted in’ a decision that was contrary to, or ‘involved’ an unreasonable ap-
plication of, established law.” Id. at 1398. Section 2254(d)(2) also provides that a federal 
court may consider granting relief if an adjudication resulted in an unreasonable determi-
nation of the facts “in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) (2006). The Supreme Court construes “in light of the evidence” as 
“clarifying language,” and concludes that this language—which is found in § 2254(d)(2) 
but not § 2254(d)(1)— “does not detract from our view that § 2254(d)(1) also is plainly 
limited to the state-court record.” Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400 n.7 (emphasis added). The 
use of the word also suggests that the Court anticipates that a court addressing claims un-
der both § 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2) may only review the state-court record. See id. 
141 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1418 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (arguing that, under the 
majority’s approach, where a claim and its supporting evidence had not been adjudicated 
on the merits, the federal court would review the purportedly “new” claim de novo); Cone 
v. Bell, 129 S. Ct. 1769, 1784 (2009) (reviewing de novo a Brady claim for which the state 
courts “did not reach the merits,” and noting that the claim was not subject to § 2254(d) 
deference); see also Fisher v. Lee, 215 F.3d 438, 446 (4th Cir. 2000) (“If the claim was prop-
erly presented to the state court and the state court adjudicated it, the deferential standard 
of review set forth in § 2254(d) applies and federal habeas relief may not be granted unless 
the relevant state-court adjudication was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law . . . or resulted in a decision that was based on an 
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State 
court proceedings. If, however, a petitioner has properly presented a claim to the state 
court but the state court has not adjudicated the claim on the merits our review of ques-
tions of law and mixed questions of law and fact is de novo.” (citations and internal quota-
tion marks omitted)). The court also could remand for an evidentiary hearing. Hoffman v. 
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ment powers are limited “only” by § 2254(e) and the habeas rules.142 
This provides a petitioner with a relatively clean slate on which to chal-
lenge procedural inadequacies in state postconviction proceedings. 
 The clearest way for state courts to fail to adjudicate a claim on the 
merits is by simply neglecting to address the claim, although this hap-
pens infrequently.143 Some circuits have held, however, that when a 
state court addresses a claim but has failed to consider all the material 
facts supporting the claim despite a petitioner’s diligence in developing 
the record, its decision also is not “on the merits” for AEDPA pur-
poses.144 Then-Judge Michael McConnell, writing for the en banc 
Tenth Circuit, noted that “[a] claim is more than a mere theory on 
which a court could grant relief; a claim must have a factual basis, and 
an adjudication of that claim requires an evaluation of that factual ba-
sis.”145 Judge McConnell concluded that when a state has ignored prof-
fered non-record evidence in adjudicating a claim, it has not adjudi-
cated that claim “on the merits”: 
When the state court relies solely upon the record evidence, 
and denies both the claim itself and an evidentiary hearing on 
the proffered non-record evidence without any alternative 
holding based upon the proffered evidence, there is no adju-
dication on the merits that would warrant deferential review. 
                                                                                                                      
Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 536 (9th Cir. 2001). But see Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401 & n.9 (noting 
that the court is still constrained by other portions of AEDPA). 
142 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401 & n.9 (finding that “[a]t a minimum . . . § 2254(e)(2) 
still restricts the discretion of federal habeas courts to consider new evidence when deciding 
claims that were not adjudicated on the merits in state court” and that “[i]n all events . . . the 
requirements of § 2254(a) through (c) remain significant limitations on the power of a fed-
eral court to grant habeas relief”). 
143 Even where a state court issues an unexplained order, an adjudication on the merits 
has typically occurred. Miller, supra note 40, at 2616 & n.147 (noting that a majority of 
courts follow this approach); see 16A Federal Procedure, Lawyers Edition § 41:179 
(2007 ed. & Supp. 2011). The federal habeas court reviewing the order is to look to the 
“last explained state-court judgment” to determine whether the state court’s order is on 
the merits or is an independent and adequate state decision that bars federal habeas re-
view (a petitioner default for failure to raise a claim, for example). See Ylst v. Nunnemaker, 
501 U.S. 797, 805 (1991) (emphasis omitted). This leaves little room for a court to decide 
that the decision was neither on the merits nor a state “independent and adequate” deci-
sion. 
144 See Marceau, supra note 19, at 62 (noting that “[t]here is . . . growing support 
among the federal courts for a recognition that a claim which has not been fully and fairly 
reviewed in state court will not be considered an adjudication on the merits for purposes 
of § 2254(d)”); see also infra notes 143–147 and accompanying text (describing cases hold-
ing that an adjudication is not on the merits unless it discusses all material facts). 
145 Wilson v. Workman, 577 F.3d 1284, 1291 (10th Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
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A merits adjudication requires the court to consider the “sub-
stance” of the defendant’s claim, and when the claim involves 
a mixed question of law and fact but a procedural rule pre-
vents the state court from even considering the factual 
grounds, the court has failed to do so.146 
The Fourth Circuit has similarly held: 
[W]hen a state court forecloses further development of the 
factual record, it passes up the opportunity that exhaustion 
ensures. If the record ultimately proves to be incomplete, def-
erence to the state court’s judgment would be inappropriate 
because judgment on a materially incomplete record is not an 
adjudication on the merits for purposes of § 2254(d).147 
Faced with Pinholster’s narrowing of courts’ discretion to develop facts, 
petitioners have already begun to argue that a state court decision re-
sulting from sparse facts and inadequate process is not an adjudication 
on the merits.148 
 In her otherwise sound Pinholster dissent, Justice Sotomayor stated 
that the Pinholster majority had rejected this approach and criticized it 
herself on the grounds that “[i]t would undermine the comity princi-
ples motivating AEDPA to decline to defer to a state-court adjudication 
of a claim because the state court, through no fault of its own, lacked 
all the relevant evidence.”149 Neither Justice Sotomayor’s characteriza-
tion of the majority opinion nor her criticism of the circuits, however, is 
                                                                                                                      
146 Id. at 1292. 
147 Winston v. Kelly, 592 F.3d 535, 555–56 (4th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted); see also 
Drake v. Portuondo, 321 F.3d 338, 345 (2d Cir. 2003) (remanding for federal discovery 
“because the state courts did not permit the development of the factual record”). Profes-
sor Justin Marceau would take this argument further, suggesting not only that a federal 
court need not provide § 2254(d) deference to a claim unadjudicated on the merits in 
state court, but also that defendants must have a full and fair hearing in either state or fed-
eral court; where a claim has not been adjudicated on the merits, the petitioner has not 
received this full and fair hearing. Marceau, supra note 19, at 62–64. 
148 See, e.g., Hurst v. Branker, No. 1:10CV725, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58910, at *27–28 
n.15 (M.D.N.C. June 1, 2011) (quoting petitioner’s argument that review under § 2254(d) 
was not appropriate because “the state . . . court’s failure to allow factual development of 
this Claim through an evidentiary hearing or other discovery procedures resulted in a 
decision that was not ‘on the merits’”); Conway v. Houk, No. 2:07-cv-947, 2011 WL 
2119373, at *2 (S.D. Ohio May 26, 2011) (“[N]oting that Pinholster prohibits consideration 
of new evidence only as to claims that the state courts ‘adjudicated’ on the merits, Peti-
tioner argues that the Ohio courts’ rulings on Petitioner’s postconviction claims were not 
‘adjudications’ for purposes of § 2254(d)(1).”). 
149 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Winston, 592 F.3d at 
555–56. 
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well founded. The majority rejected the argument “that § 2254(d)(1) 
. . . does not apply when a federal habeas court has admitted new evi-
dence that supports a claim previously adjudicated in state court,” but it 
did not decide what is required for a claim to be “adjudicated on the 
merits.”150 Thus, Pinholster bars one way of overcoming § 2254(d)—the 
use of new evidence—but it does not speak to when § 2254(d) applies 
in the first place or to other possible ways of overcoming it. 
 Further, the Fourth and Tenth Circuit cases cited by Justice So-
tomayor did not decline to apply § 2254(d) when the state court lacked 
relevant evidence “through no fault of its own”151 (such as, for exam-
ple, when a state court witness becomes more forthcoming in federal 
court). Although some courts had taken that position,152 the cases Jus-
tice Sotomayor cited in Pinholster specifically limited their holdings to 
situations in which a state court has refused “proffered non-record evi-
dence”153 or has “foreclose[d] further development of the factual re-
cord.”154 The key issue under this approach is not the existence of new 
evidence, but the adequacy of the state court’s fact development pro-
cedures. 
 Nonetheless, even properly understood it seems unlikely that the 
Court, if it finally clarifies AEDPA’s procedural requirements, will follow 
this approach. Indeed, the First Circuit, in rejecting the broader (but 
similar) argument that “a state court has not adjudicated a claim on the 
merits unless it has given a full and fair evidentiary hearing” asserted 
that such a holding would “eviscerate” Pinholster.155 More concretely, 
although the Tenth Circuit’s definition of a claim is eminently reason-
                                                                                                                      
150 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1400. A petitioner in Virginia recently made essentially this 
argument. Teleguz v. Kelly, No. 7:10CV00254, 2011 WL 3319885, at *8 (W.D. Va. Aug. 1, 
2011) (“[Pinholster] expressly declined to establish how to distinguish claims adjudicated 
on the merits from . . . new claims. Teleguz contends that Winston v. Kelly remains good law 
in drawing this distinction. He contends that, because the state habeas court refused an 
evidentiary hearing, the record before it was materially incomplete, and his new evidence 
thus merits consideration under Pinholster.” (citations omitted)). 
151 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see Winston, 592 F.3d at 555–
56. 
152 See, e.g., Brown, 551 F.3d at 429 (“We think that [AEDPA deference does not apply] 
whenever new, substantial evidence supporting a habeas claim comes to light during the 
proceedings in federal district court.”); Monroe, 323 F.3d at 297 (“AEDPA’s deference re-
quirement does not apply when a claim made on federal habeas review is premised on 
Brady material that has surfaced for the first time during federal proceedings.”). 
153 Wilson, 577 F.3d at 1292. 
154 Winston, 592 F.3d at 555. 
155 Atkins v. Clarke, 642 F.3d 47, 49 (1st Cir. 2011); see also infra notes 204–282 and ac-
companying text (describing arguments regarding full and fair hearings, due process, and 
the Suspension Clause). 
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able, other, less nuanced approaches may find traction with a Supreme 
Court seemingly bent on reading AEDPA as restrictively as possible.156 
AEDPA does not, after all, say that § 2254(d)(1) and § 2254(d)(2) ap-
ply only if there was an adequate adjudication on the merits, or an adju-
dication with a complete state-court record.157 As one magistrate judge 
in the Eastern District of California held after Pinholster, “An adjudica-
tion on the merits is just that regardless of one’s view on the complete-
ness of the record on which the ruling was made.”158 This view is consis-
tent with the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Harrington v. Richter, in 
which it held that a state court’s one-line denial of relief is an adjudica-
tion on the merits.159 As the Court observed, “When a federal claim has 
been presented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it 
may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim on the 
merits in the absence of any indication or state-law procedural princi-
ples to the contrary.”160 
 Harrington addresses a different question, of course, and there may 
be room to argue that a failure to allow fair fact development is an “in-
dication” of a non-merits adjudication. Especially in light of Justice So-
tomayor’s explicit rejection of the leading cases adopting this view, 
however, the Court may be more likely to follow other approaches if 
forced to finally address AEDPA’s procedural guarantees. 
                                                                                                                      
156 For an example of a less-nuanced approach, see Teti v. Bender, 507 F.3d 50, 56–57 
(1st Cir. 2007) (“A matter is ‘adjudicated on the merits’ if there is a ‘decision finally resolv-
ing the parties’ claims, with res judicata effect, that is based on the substance of the claim 
advanced, rather than on a procedural, or other, ground.’ . . . [Section] 2254(d) applies 
regardless of the procedures employed or the decision reached by the state court, as long 
as a substantive decision was reached; the adequacy of the procedures and of the decision 
are addressed through the lens of § 2254(d), not as a threshold matter.”). 
157 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (2006) (“An application for a writ of habeas corpus on be-
half of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted 
with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings 
unless . . . .”). 
158 Coddington v. Cullen, No. CIV S-01-1290 KJM GGH DP, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
57442, at *7–8 n.9 (E.D. Cal. May 27, 2011) (“Nor will an assertion—that because the state 
record was incomplete, there was no adjudication on the merits—operate to avoid the 
[Pinholster] holding.”); see also Valdez v. Cockrell, 274 F.3d 941, 950 (5th Cir. 2001) (noting 
that the term “‘adjudication on the merits’ . . . does not speak to the quality of the proc-
ess”). 
159 131 S. Ct. 770, 784–85 (2011). 
160 Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784–85. 
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B. Inadequate State Fact Development as an Unreasonable Determination of the 
Facts in Light of the Evidence 
 Another possible way of surmounting inadequate state fact-
development procedures in light of Pinholster—one that may be increas-
ingly popular and may again force the Court toward a decision on 
AEDPA’s procedural boundaries—is to argue that procedural deficien-
cies and/or the resulting paucity of evidence rendered the state court’s 
factual determinations “unreasonable . . . in light of the evidence,” thus 
satisfying § 2254(d)(2).161 Professor Yackle observes that under 
§ 2254(d)(2), “a federal court can scarcely be indifferent to the process 
by which a state court reached a factual finding or the evidentiary sup-
port that finding enjoys.”162 Indeed, this argument has found some 
traction. Judge Kozinski has identified four potential types of unrea-
sonable factual determinations that result from procedural flaws: situa-
tions when state courts fail to make a finding of fact, when courts mis-
takenly make factual findings under the wrong legal standard, when 
“the fact-finding process itself is defective,” and when courts “plainly 
misapprehend or misstate the record in making their findings, and the 
misapprehension goes to a material factual issue that is central to peti-
tioner’s claim.”163 The most relevant of these claims after Pinholster is 
the third—when the factfinding process is flawed. 
 Several circuit courts followed this course prior to Pinholster, hold-
ing that certain state procedural violations (“flawed fact-finding” under 
Judge Kozinski’s framework) result in unreasonable determinations 
under § 2254(d)(2). The Ninth Circuit has, predictably, gone the far-
thest, holding that if a defendant establishes any of the factors in a state 
court proceeding identified as necessitating a federal evidentiary hear-
ing in Townsend v. Sain,164 “then the state court’s decision was based on 
an unreasonable determination of the facts and the federal court can 
independently review the merits of that decision by conducting an evi-
                                                                                                                      
161 See, e.g., Wood v. Allen, 465 F. Supp. 2d at 1211, 1242 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (finding an 
unreasonable determination of the facts and granting habeas relief where the state court 
adopted verbatim the state’s proposed findings of fact), rev’d in part, 542 F.3d 1281 (11th 
Cir. 2008), aff’d, 130 S. Ct. 841 (2010) (concluding that the state court’s factfinding was 
not unreasonable but refusing to reach “the questions of how and when § 2254(e)(1) ap-
plies in challenges to a state court’s factual determinations under § 2254(d)(2)”); see also 
Brief for the ACLU and the ACLU of Alabama as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
supra note 46, at 25–26 (discussing the district court’s holding). 
162 Yackle, supra note 17, at 141. 
163 Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d. 992, 1000–01 (9th Cir. 2004). 
164 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963), overruled on other grounds, Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 
U.S. 1, 5 (1992). 
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dentiary hearing.”165 The Townsend factors include a range of state fact 
development deficiencies, including, among others, where “the fact-
finding procedure employed by the state court was not adequate to af-
ford a full and fair hearing,” “the material facts were not adequately 
developed at the state-court hearing,” or, most broadly, “for any reason 
it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant 
a full and fair fact hearing.”166 
 The Third Circuit has similarly observed: 
The extent to which a state court afforded a defendant ade-
quate procedural means to develop a factual record—whether 
the defendant was afforded a “full and fair hearing,” to put it 
in the parlance of the pre-AEDPA statute—may well affect 
whether a state court’s factual determination was “reasonable” 
in “light of the evidence presented in the State court proceed-
ing . . . .”167 
This position is fairly satisfying from a textual standpoint, and others, 
like Yackle, have subscribed to it.168 The trouble arises, though, in 
AEDPA’s statutory history.169 Prior to the 1996 amendments, § 2254(d) 
afforded state court factual findings deference only if they “met several 
tests for procedural regularity and substantive accuracy [which] essen-
tially tracked the Townsend criteria.”170 These requirements were, of 
course, omitted in AEDPA, and, as the Fifth Circuit noted in rejecting a 
full-and-fair-hearing prerequisite to AEDPA deference, “[t]o reintro-
                                                                                                                      
165 Earp v. Ornoski, 431 F.3d 1158, 1167 (9th Cir. 2005). 
166 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313. The Ninth Circuit has also held, after Pinholster, that a 
state court’s fact-development procedures were “fundamentally flawed” when the court 
refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing and offered the petitioner no other “opportu-
nity . . . to develop his claim.” Hurles v. Ryan, 650 F.3d 1301, 1311 (9th Cir. 2011). 
167 Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 239 (3d Cir. 2004). But see Rountree v. Balicki, 
640 F.3d 530, 537–38 (3d Cir. 2011) (presenting § 2254(e)(1) as a necessary component of 
the § 2254(d)(2) inquiry), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 533 (2011). 
168 See Marceau, supra note 19, at 58 (describing the “alternative approach” to 
§ 2254(d)(2), which is “to recognize that a state process is ‘unreasonable’ for purposes of 
§ 2254(d)(2) where ‘the process employed by the state court is defective.’” (quoting Taylor, 
366 F.3d at 999)). Professor Marceau notes that Judge Kozinski also endorses this view. Id. 
(citing Hertz & Liebman, supra note 65, § 20.2c, at 923 n.78) (noting that Judge Kozinski, 
Randy Hertz, and James Liebman endorse this view). 
169 A second issue arises from the interaction of § 2254(e)(1), which provides a pre-
sumption of correctness for state court factual findings, and § 2254(d)(2). See supra note 
46. 
170 Yackle, supra note 17, at 139. 
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duce a full and fair hearing requirement . . . would have the untenable 
result of rendering the amendments enacted by Congress a nullity.”171 
 Nonetheless, a court need not “nullify” AEDPA by importing the 
Townsend factors in order to find a procedural component in 
§ 2254(d)(2). Perhaps the best reading of the statute is that, just as 
§ 2254(d)(1) lowered but did not eliminate review of state court legal 
decisions, § 2254(d)(2) lowered but did not eliminate procedural pre-
requisites to deference to state court factual determinations. Thus, a 
state court decision (or procedural rule) barring fact development that 
is merely wrong would not satisfy § 2254(d)(2), but an unreasonably 
wrong decision (or rule) would.172 
 If this is correct, then a test for whether fact development is re-
quired is needed as a benchmark—unreasonableness, in the abstract, is 
not a workable standard. Using Townsend as this benchmark is the obvi-
ous solution; the case speaks directly to the circumstances in which a 
federal evidentiary hearing is required and was clearly the basis for 
AEDPA’s predecessor statute.173 
C. New Claims Under § 2254(e)(2) 
 When a state court has failed to adjudicate a claim, its decision 
may not only be an unreasonable determination of the facts; the peti-
tioner also may have a new claim in federal court.174 Both the majority 
                                                                                                                      
 
171 Valdez, 274 F.3d at 949–50. The Seventh Circuit has similarly held that state court 
determinations, even if not resulting from a “hearing on the merits of [the] factual issue,” 
must receive AEDPA deference. Mendiola v. Schomig, 224 F.3d 589, 592–93 (7th Cir. 
2000). But see supra note 19 (describing arguments in the literature to the contrary). 
172 Cf. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000) (establishing an “objectively unreason-
able” standard for § 2254(d)(1)). Somewhat similarly, § 2254(d)(1) could, arguably, be satis-
fied by a showing that the state court fact development failed to satisfy due process require-
ments and thus involved an “unreasonable application of federal law.” This argument is taken 
up in Part III. See infra notes 204–282 and accompanying text. It would be, if possible, far 
preferable to make this claim via 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (although the results of the two ap-
proaches are somewhat different): under § 2254(d)(1), a petitioner would be forced to over-
come AEDPA deference in addition to achieving the formidable task of establishing a post-
conviction due process violation. 
173 Indeed, Professor Marceau proposes that Townsend not only offers a framework for 
deciding when a hearing is required, but also provides a “landmark for understanding the 
constitutional content” of the hearing, which he argues must be “full and fair.” Marceau, 
supra note 19, at 16. Fundamental fairness under the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment would be another possibility, but, as discussed in Section III.B., infra 
notes 250–282 and accompanying text, a state’s failure to provide procedural due process 
in postconviction review is likely subject to challenge via § 1983. 
174 Often, this may be a difficult distinction to make. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401 
n.10 (declining to “draw the line between new claims and claims adjudicated on the mer-
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and dissent in Pinholster recognized that new evidence could, under 
some circumstances, give rise to new claims for relief potentially not 
subject to § 2254(d).175 Although this may allow some petitioners sad-
dled with an underdeveloped state-court record access to federal dis-
covery, for most, it likely will not. At the least, this type of argument 
will—as will those in Sections A and B of Part III176—force the Court 
toward a decision on federal habeas courts’ necessary deference to facts 
that state courts simply did not address or addressed through a defi-
cient process. 
 AEDPA requires that state prisoners exhaust their state court rem-
edies.177 Exhaustion, in turn, requires presenting to the state court 
both the legal and factual178 bases of a claim; unexhausted claims must 
be dismissed.179 Petitioners may sometimes be able to return to state 
                                                                                                                      
its”). New claims may arise in several circumstances: when a petitioner raises a claim in 
state court and later discovers new evidence that gives rise to a claim that is “fundamen-
tally” different from the original claim (thus causing the new claim to be unadjudicated); 
when a petitioner raises a claim in state court but the court fails to address it or addresses 
it in a deficient way, and the petitioner later discovers new evidence that gives rise to a 
claim that is “fundamentally” different from the original claim; or when a petitioner has 
failed to raise a claim in state court (therefore preventing state adjudication) and later 
discovers new evidence to support the claim. 
175 See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1401 n.10 (suggesting that Justice Sotomayor’s hypotheti-
cal, involving a petitioner who discovers undisclosed Brady material following state post-
conviction review, “may well present a new claim”); id. at 1417–18 (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing) (describing two scenarios—one in which a petitioner raises a Brady claim in state 
postconviction review and after completion of the review discovers exculpatory Brady ma-
terial, and another in which the petitioner does not raise a Brady claim in state court and 
then discovers Brady material—and arguing that the petitioner will only have a new claim 
under AEDPA in the latter scenario). 
176 See infra notes 204–282 and accompanying text. 
177 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (2006). 
178 See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690–91 (2004) (making clear that under 
AEDPA, petitioner must “satisf[y] the exhaustion requirement” for both the legal and fac-
tual grounds of his claims). 
179 See, e.g., Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 522 (1982) (holding that “a district court must 
dismiss habeas petitions containing both unexhausted and exhausted claims”); Griffin v. 
Rogers, 399 F.3d 626, 632 (6th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging the Supreme Court’s pre-AEDPA 
directive to dismiss petitions with both exhausted and unexhausted claims, which allowed 
petitioners to return to state court to “exhaust their remaining state claims,” and noting that 
AEDPA’s one-year limitations period makes re-filing difficult (citing Rose, 455 U.S. at 522)); 
see also supra note 65 and accompanying text (describing the stay-and-abeyance procedure for 
petitions with exhausted and unexhausted claims, which is an alternative to dismissal); cf. 
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 182–83 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (“First, al-
though the Court’s pre-AEDPA decision in Rose v. Lundy prescribed the dismissal of federal 
habeas corpus petitions containing unexhausted claims, in our post-AEDPA world there is no 
reason why a district court should not retain jurisdiction over a meritorious claim and stay 
further proceedings pending the complete exhaustion of state remedies.”). 
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court to exhaust their claims (as happened in Pinholster), but such 
claims are frequently barred under state procedural rules against 
“piecemeal” litigation.180 In these circumstances, the lack of available 
state remedies satisfies the exhaustion requirement because the peti-
tioner has raised and the state court has addressed the claims (by deny-
ing them),181 but petitioners must still overcome the procedural default 
doctrine. Under this “corollary to the habeas statute’s exhaustion re-
quirement . . . federal courts will not disturb state court judgments 
based on adequate and independent state law procedural grounds.”182 
In this scenario, the state court, having procedurally barred a peti-
tioner’s claims under its rules against piecemeal litigation, has ad-
dressed the claims—thus exhausting them—but also has caused the 
claims to be procedurally defaulted.183 There is a narrow “equitable 
exception” to the doctrine, however, when a habeas applicant can dem-
onstrate either cause and prejudice from the procedural default or that 
the petitioner is actually innocent or factually ineligible for the death 
ena
                                                                                                                     
p lty.184 
 With respect to procedural default, although “the Court has not yet 
supplied an ‘exhaustive catalog of . . . objective impediments to compli-
ance with a procedural rule,’”185 (a catalog that may be necessary after 
 
180 Hoffstadt, supra note 44, at 1161; see also supra note 65. If the petitioner successfully 
returns to state court to exhaust his claims, these claims may still be deemed untimely 
when he again reaches federal court. Jason Mazzone, When the Supreme Court Is Not Supreme, 
104 Nw. U. L. Rev. 979, 1016–17 (2010) (“[U]nless the district court holds a mixed peti-
tion [(a petition containing exhausted and unexhausted claims)] in abeyance in order to 
permit exhaustion of the unexhausted claims, the statute of limitations may have expired 
by the time the petitioner returns to federal court.” (footnote omitted)). 
181 Hoffstadt, supra note 44, at 1161–62 (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 
732 (1991)). 
182 Dretke v. Haley, 541 U.S. 386, 392 (2004); cf. Quezada v. Scribner, No. CV 04-7532-
RSWL (MLG), 2011 WL 3652245, at *8 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2011) (allowing factual devel-
opment of petitioner’s attempt to demonstrate cause for procedural default “because Pin-
holster’s prohibition on consideration of new evidence only applies to claims ‘adjudicated 
on the merits’”), aff’d, No. CV 04-07532-RSWL(MLGx), 2011 WL 4899910 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 
13, 2011); United States ex rel. Brady v. Hardy, No. 10 C 2098, 2011 WL 1575662, at *1–3 
(N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2011) (determining that, under Pinholster, a court could consider evi-
dence from a federal evidentiary hearing to determine whether a petitioner could “over-
come . . . procedural default [of the claim] by showing his actual innocence”). 
183 See Hoffstadt, supra note 44, at 1162. 
184 Dretke, 541 U.S. at 393. Additionally, “to the extent that state postconviction reme-
dies are ‘ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant’ . . . such remedies need not be 
exhausted as a predicate to federal habeas corpus review.” Freedman, supra note 116, at 
1093 n.79 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2000)). 
185 Hertz & Liebman, supra note 65, § 26.3b (alteration in original) (quoting Murray 
v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). 
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Pinholster), inadequate state fact development procedures have not, of 
themselves, been held to amount to “cause.”186 Deficient procedures 
may, however, provide the foundation for a petitioner’s claim that “the 
‘factual or legal basis’ for the claim ‘was not reasonably available,’” and 
thus that the petitioner had cause for procedural default in state 
ur
lines to expand the record on direct appeal may not allow adequate 
                                                                                                                     
co t.187 
 The Court’s recent decision in Martinez v. Ryan188 provides some 
support for this position, at least with respect to ineffective assistance of 
trial counsel claims in states that require them to be raised for the first 
time in a collateral proceeding.189 In Martinez, the Court held that a lack 
of effective counsel in such an “initial-review” collateral proceeding 
amounts to cause for a procedural default of an ineffective trial assis-
tance claim.190 Although Martinez is narrowly focused on the right to 
effective trial counsel, its holding is based, inter alia, on the fact that a 
“prisoner is in no position to develop the evidentiary basis for a claim of 
ineffective assistance, which often turns on evidence outside the trial 
record.”191 Unfair fact development procedures, of course, raise the 
same concern for Strickland, Brady, and other claims involving evidence 
outside the trial record. Martinez says nothing directly about the issue, 
but it does at least note in passing that in states that allow ineffective tri-
al assistance claims to be raised on direct appeal, “[a]bbreviated dead-
 
186 See id. (omitting inadequate state fact-development procedures from a list of rea-
sons for which courts have found “cause”). Alternatively (or additionally), a petitioner 
could argue under § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) that the court could grant habeas relief without 
requiring exhaustion because “circumstances exist that render [the state] process ineffec-
tive to protect the rights of the applicant.” 
187 Hoffstadt, supra note 44, at 1163 (quoting Murray, 477 U.S. at 488). In the exhaus-
tion context, a petitioner could similarly argue under AEDPA that the deficient proce-
dures rendered the state process “ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant,” and 
thus that he need not exhaust the claim in state court before seeking federal habeas relief. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(B)(ii) (2006). Unless the state process is inadequate on its face, 
however, this approach may not succeed. See infra notes 250–282 and accompanying text 
(discussing due process challenges to state postconviction procedures and the unresolved 
questions of individual versus general fairness). In cases in which a state postconviction 
court improperly held that a claim was procedurally barred, of course, the petitioner also 
will find relief from default (and from Pinholster’s evidentiary bar). See, e.g., James, 659 F.3d 
at 876, 878–79, 892 (reversing a state court determination that petitioner’s Strickland claim 
was procedurally defaulted, determining that Pinholster therefore did not apply, allowing 
the court to consider evidence developed by petitioner’s federal habeas counsel, and re-
manding the case to grant the writ). 
188 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). 
189 Id. at 1314–15. 
190 Id. at 1315. 
191 Id. at 1317. 
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time for an attorney to investigate the ineffective-assistance claim.”192 In 
any case, if this theory is accepted, a federal court could hold an eviden-
tiary hearing on whether the petitioner has demonstrated cause and 
prejudice (which largely mirrors the merits inquiry),193 thereby circum-
venting the inadequate state fact-development procedures.194 
 Even if courts are willing to expand the definition of “cause” in this 
way—and this might be the type of “distortion of . . . the law on ‘cause 
and prejudice’” foretold by Justice Alito in his prediction of Pinholster’s 
effect on the jurisprudence195—there remain significant reasons to 
doubt that it will provide a meaningful remedy for petitioners pre-
vented from developing the factual bases for their claims in state court. 
First and most importantly, presenting a new claim based on new evi-
dence requires, by definition, that the petitioner already possess the 
new evidence.196 Petitioners, most of whom lack counsel197 and do not 
know what evidence to look for or where they would find it, typically 
will have few options to locate new evidence. For obvious reasons, then, 
it is not an ideal solution for the problem of inadequate access to dis-
covery. 
                                                                                                                      
192 Id. at 1318 (citing Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocat-
ing Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 Cornell L. Rev. 679, 689, 689 n.57 (2004)). 
193 The Court has not set a uniform standard for prejudice resulting from procedural 
default, but it probably requires at least “a showing that the defaulted claim was meritori-
ous and would probably have resulted in a different verdict or sentence.” Hoffstadt, supra 
note 44, at 1163–64. 
194 See Cristin v. Brennan, 281 F.3d 404, 413, 415–16 (3d Cir. 2002) (reasoning that 
§ 2254(e)(2)’s limitation ordinarily should not apply to the facts supporting a petitioner’s 
attempt to show cause and prejudice for a state court procedural default, because the 
court “cannot generally expect petitioners to present in state court facts they may only 
need under federal law in a later federal proceeding to excuse a procedural default”); 
Catherine T. Struve, Direct and Collateral Federal Court Review of the Adequacy of State Procedural 
Rules, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 243, 315 (2003) (“[C]urrent law limits the circumstances under 
which the petitioner can obtain an evidentiary hearing in a federal habeas proceeding on 
‘the factual basis of a claim.’ This limitation, however, arguably should not apply to the 
facts relevant to show cause for, and prejudice from, a procedural default.”); see also Hertz 
& Liebman, supra note 65, § 26.3e. 
195 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1411 (Alito, J., concurring in part). 
196 See, e.g., Sok v. Substance Abuse Treatment Facility, No. 1:11-cv-00284-JLT HC, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54014, at *6–7 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2011) (“The normal procedure for 
petitioners in federal habeas courts is first to be in possession of facts that support the peti-
tioner’s habeas claims, and then to present those claims to this Court, not the other way 
around.”). 
197 See Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro Se 
Plaintiff, 16 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol’y 475, 479–80 (2002) (explaining that 
approximately ninety-six percent of “§ 1983 cases filed by inmates challenging the condi-
tions of their confinement” are brought pro se). 
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 Second, as observed by Justice Sotomayor in dissent, even when it 
is available, new evidence will frequently not give rise to a new claim 
under the Court’s exhaustion precedent;198 indeed, to do so it must 
“fundamentally alter the legal claim already considered by the state 
courts.”199 Thus, a petitioner who discovers stronger proof of, for ex-
ample, his lawyer’s failure to conduct an adequate investigation follow-
ing a state court decision, will have no new claim on which to attempt 
to obtain a hearing (and ultimately relief).200 
 Recognizing this problem, some petitioners have suggested that 
federal courts could allow discovery which would then form the basis of 
new state claims.201 As one magistrate judge noted, this approach 
“turns the entire federal habeas process on its head,”202 and courts, 
which apply the exhaustion doctrine with “extraordinary rigidity,”203 
are unlikely to welcome this approach. 
                                                                                                                     
 Together, all of the AEDPA challenges to deficient state proceed-
ings assume that courts—which will likely face many more of these 
types of claims after Pinholster—read a minimal procedural guarantee 
into AEDPA. Despite the impressive scholarly record and many court 
decisions supporting this interpretation, the current trajectory of the 
Roberts Court’s AEDPA jurisprudence, and particularly the Court’s re-
jection of an extremely plausible textual argument for federal fact de-
velopment under § 2254(d)(1) in Pinholster, suggests that that reading 
is on uncertain ground. AEDPA’s text, however, is not the only possible 
 
198 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1418 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
199 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 260 (1986). 
200 Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1417–18 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Justice Sotomayor pro-
vides a hypothetical example of a petitioner who “diligently attempted in state court to 
develop the factual basis” of a Brady claim for unconstitutionally withheld exculpatory 
evidence. See id. at 1417. She notes that if the state court denied relief on this claim but 
later ordered the disclosure of new evidence of exculpatory witness statements in response 
to a petitioner’s public records act request, a federal court could not consider this new 
evidence. Id. at 1417–18. If, on the other hand, the petitioner had not raised the Brady 
claim below he could bring in the new evidence if he showed cause and prejudice under 
AEDPA. Id. at 1418. Pinholster, in other words, may punish defendants who diligently raised 
claims in state court and discover new evidence after the state court decision. Id.; see also 
Ruffin v. Dir. Nev. Dep’t of Corr., No. 2:07-cv-00721-RLH-PAL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
62946, at *11–12 n.10 (D. Nev. June 13, 2011) (“[N]ew evidence might not render a fed-
eral claim unexhausted under Vasquez v. Hillery, but the federal court nonetheless would be 
precluded from considering the new evidence under Cullen v. Pinholster in applying 28 
U.S.C. § 2254(d).”). 
201 E.g., Coddington, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57442, at *8–9. 
202 Id. at *10 (concluding that “[r]equiring full development of all issues in state court 
before arriving at federal court is the goal of exhaustion and AEDPA”). 
203 Yackle, supra note 113, at 372. 
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source of relief for inadequate state fact-development procedures. 
When the Court does decide the issue—as it will have to after Pinhol-
ster—it will do so in the shadow of a looming Suspension Clause chal-
lenge and the critical questions such a challenge would raise. 
III. The Ill-Defined Right to Fair Postconviction Review 
 Petitioners seeking a remedy for curtailed fact development in 
state postconviction proceedings are not limited to the text of AEDPA. 
If the Court refuses to find a guarantee of fairness in the statute, the 
Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene v. Bush 204 will provide the basis for 
a Suspension Clause challenge, explored in Section A.205 Independent 
of future developments in federal habeas, state prisoners can also bring 
due process challenges, addressed in Section B,206 to state postconvic-
tion review procedures under District Attorney’s Office v. Osborne 207 and 
Skinner v. Switzer 208—and will likely do so more frequently after Pinhol-
ster. Resolving either of these sets of claims would require addressing 
long-unanswered questions about the nature of the right to a fair hear-
ing in postconviction litigation. 
A. A Right to a Fair Adjudication of a Federal Claim Under  
the Suspension Clause 
 Despite a fuller treatment in recent cases arising from the deten-
tion of “enemy combatants” in Guantanamo Bay, the scope and content 
of the Suspension Clause remain somewhat ambiguous. To address a 
Suspension Clause challenge to a reading of AEDPA that is indifferent 
to the fairness of the state proceedings, the Court would have to first 
decide whether the Suspension Clause extends to state prisoners and, if 
it does, to determine what constitutes a “full and fair opportunity”209 to 
litigate constitutional claims. 
 The Suspension Clause provides that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebel-
lion or Invasion the public Safety may require it,”210 and has ancient 
                                                                                                                      
204 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
205 See infra notes 209–249 and accompanying text. 
206 See infra notes 250–282 and accompanying text. 
207 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2320 (2009). 
208 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011). 
209 Marceau suggests that “full and fair” and “fundamentally fair” as used in Osborne 
and Medina are synonymous. See Marceau, supra note 19, at 24 & n.107. 
210 U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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roots in English law.211 The Writ was then, as it is now, an important 
means to challenge unlawful custody;212 suspension, by removing the 
remedy, effectively eliminates the federal right against unlawful impris-
onment.213 As the Supreme Court has observed, “Simply because [un-
constitutional] detention . . . is intolerable, the opportunity for redress, 
which presupposes the opportunity to be heard, to argue and present 
evidence, must never be totally foreclosed.”214 
 The Supreme Court upheld AEDPA’s limits on “second or succes-
sive” habeas petitions against a Suspension Clause challenge in 1996 in 
Felker v. Turpin, a case that provided limited guidance as to the Court’s 
likely approach under other, more specific Suspension Clause chal-
lenges.215 In holding that “the added restrictions which the Act places 
on second [federal] habeas petitions . . . do not amount to a ‘suspen-
sion’ of the writ contrary to Article I, § 9,”216 the Court assumed, as it 
has at other times,217 that the Suspension Clause protects the right of 
state prisoners to federal habeas rather than merely “the writ ‘as it ex-
                                                                                                                      
211 See Andrew Franz, “Shall Not Be Suspended, Unless . . .”: A Tale of Habeas Corpus, Crim. 
L. Bull., Summer 2007, at 330, 331 (2007) (explaining that, following Darnel’s Case, where 
five knights were imprisoned without cause for refusing to pay mandatory loans to Charles 
I, “Lord Coke convinced the House of Commons to unanimously adopt three resolutions 
concerning habeas corpus as a matter of right” and “[i]n 1679, the first Habeas Corpus Act 
was passed” (citation omitted)); see also Samuel Wiseman, Discrimination, Coercion, and the 
Bail Reform Act of 1984: The Loss of the Core Constitutional Protections of the Excessive Bail Clause, 
36 Fordham Urb. L.J. 121, 124–25 (2009) (describing Darnel’s Case). 
212 But see Hoffman & King, supra note 16, at 795 (citing to recent Suspension Clause 
decisions, experience with AEDPA, and “continuing failures in indigent defense” in argu-
ing that, “[a]lthough there were important reasons to support a system of duplicative post-
conviction litigation during the incorporation controversies of the 1960s and 1970s, those 
justifications are no longer compelling”). 
213 The Court began its habeas analysis in Boumediene by tracing the English roots that 
inspired the founders’ inclusion of the Suspension Clause in the Constitution in holding 
that the clause applied to individuals in custody at Guantanamo Bay. Boumediene, 553 U.S. 
at 742–43, 771. The Court observed that England’s history of cyclical suspension and de-
nial of the writ for political or other reasons “was known to the Framers” and that “the 
Framers considered the writ a vital instrument for the protection of individual liberty.” Id. 
at 741–43. In addition to its liberty protections, the Court emphasized that the “the writ of 
habeas corpus is itself an indispensable mechanism for monitoring the separation of pow-
ers.” Id. at 765. The government may not “switch the Constitution on or off at will” —
including the Suspension Clause—by, for example, arguing that it has sovereignty over 
certain areas but not others. Id. 
214 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963) (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 
345–50 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
215 518 U.S. 651, 654, 657 (1996). 
216 Id. at 664. 
217 See, e.g., INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 293, 300–01 (2001) (quoting Felker, 518 U.S. at 
663–64)). 
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isted in 1789,’” which protected only federal prisoners.218 Pinholster will 
force a square decision on this matter, however: state defendants, faced 
with inadequate state factfinding procedures and barred from any fed-
eral fact development, likely will argue that habeas has been sus-
pended, not just limited as it was under AEDPA. In light of the Court’s 
past assumption that state prisoners may access the right, and the 
weight of scholarly authority supporting this assumption,219 the Court is 
likely to hold that the Suspension Clause extends to state prisoners, 
though the question is far from beyond doubt. The Court would then 
have to decide the more difficult question of the nature of the fair pro-
ceeding that the Suspension Clause requires—an issue only recently 
introduced in the Court’s most thorough discussion of the Suspension 
Clause, found in Boumediene.220 
 Boumediene, which held that the Suspension Clause applied to indi-
viduals in custody at Guantanamo Bay,221 did not address state prison-
ers’ habeas rights.222 Nonetheless, Boumediene provides important guid-
ance for a post-Pinholster Suspension Clause challenge to AEDPA. After 
holding that Guantanamo Bay prisoners were “entitled to the privilege 
of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention,”223 Boume-
diene asked whether the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA), the 
statute that suspended the writ for Guantanamo prisoners, “provided 
                                                                                                                      
218 Felker, 518 U.S. at 663–64. 
219 See Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus: Rethinking the Great Writ of Liberty 
9–11 (2003) (arguing that Ex Parte Bollman, which held that section 14 of the Judiciary Act 
of 1789 (granting federal courts habeas powers) did not apply to state convictions, was 
wrongly decided, and that “[t]he Bollman-derived idea that the federal writ of habeas cor-
pus was not originally available to state prisoners should be discarded”); Hoffman & King, 
supra note 16, at 839 (“Based on this jurisprudence, we believe that when squarely pre-
sented with this issue, the Court will acknowledge that the Suspension Clause provides at 
least some level of constitutional protection for federal judicial review of the constitutional 
rights of persons serving state sentences.”); Jordan Steiker, Incorporating the Suspension 
Clause: Is There a Constitutional Right to Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners?, 92 Mich. L. 
Rev. 862, 868 (1994) (arguing that the Suspension Clause, together with the Fourteenth 
Amendment, “mandate[s] federal habeas review of the convictions of state prisoners”); cf. 
Francis Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 Duke L.J. 605, 605, 607 (arguing 
that the “Constitution’s habeas corpus clause is a directive to all superior courts of record, 
state as well as federal, to make the habeas privilege routinely available,” but noting Justice 
John Marshall’s belief that the privilege is not available to state prisoners). 
220 See 553 U.S. at 771. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 733–34 (noting that the petitioners in Boumediene were detained subject to 
federal law). 
223 Id. at 771. 
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adequate substitute procedures for habeas corpus.”224 The Court ex-
plained that “any constitutionally adequate habeas corpus proceeding” 
must, at a minimum, “entitle[] the prisoner to a meaningful opportu-
nity to demonstrate that he is being held pursuant to the erroneous 
application or interpretation of relevant law” and give the habeas court 
“the power to order the conditional release of an individual unlawfully 
detained.”225 Beyond these general principles, “the necessary scope of 
habeas review in part depends upon the rigor of any earlier proceed-
ings.”226 
 Accordingly, the Court looked to the procedures employed in the 
Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) used to adjudicate enemy 
combatant status and found “considerable risk of error in the tribunal’s 
findings of fact.”227 In light of this, the Constitution required that the 
habeas court have the power to assess the sufficiency of the evidence 
against the prisoner and “consider relevant exculpatory evidence that 
was not introduced during the earlier proceeding.”228 The DTA, how-
ever, did not allow the introduction of new evidence or give the review-
ing court the authority to order a prisoner’s release, and the Court 
therefore held that it was not an adequate habeas substitute.229 
 As Joseph Hoffman and Nancy King have noted, “The Court was 
careful . . . to distinguish the statutory scheme in Boumediene from judi-
cial review of detention based on a criminal conviction.”230 Significantly 
for post-Pinholster Suspension Clause challenges, however, the distinc-
tion was predicated on the existence of a convicted prisoner’s prior 
“full and fair” opportunity to develop the factual basis of his claims: 
By foreclosing consideration of evidence not presented or 
reasonably available to the detainee at the CSRT proceedings, 
the DTA disadvantages the detainee by limiting the scope of 
collateral review to a record that may not be accurate or com-
plete. In other contexts, e.g., in post-trial habeas cases where 
the prisoner already has had a full and fair opportunity to de-
                                                                                                                      
224 Id. at 771–72. The government argued that the DTA, which granted detainees a 
hearing before a Combatant Status Review Tribunal and a limited review by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, provided adequate process and an adequate 
substitute for habeas. Id. at 733, 735, 771–72. 
225 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 779 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
226 Id. at 781. 
227 Id. at 785. 
228 Id. at 786. 
229 Id. at 787–92. 
230 Hoffman & King, supra note 16, at 840. 
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velop the factual predicate of his claims, similar limitations on 
the scope of habeas review may be appropriate. See Williams v. 
Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 436–[]37 (2000) (noting that § 2254 
“does not equate prisoners who exercise diligence in pursuing 
their claims with those who do not”).231 
 There is, then, a strong argument under Boumediene that AEDPA 
cannot constitutionally foreclose the consideration of new evidence in 
federal court when petitioners have been denied a full and fair hearing 
at the state level.232 Even so, Boumediene leaves unresolved under the 
Suspension Clause the same question left unresolved in postconviction 
due process:233 whether a prisoner is entitled to a fair hearing on fac-
tual issues in his particular case, or whether it is sufficient that the 
state’s procedures are fair on their face or fair as generally applied. Put 
another way, does the Suspension Clause provide the right to a fair 
hearing, or merely the “right to a right to” a fair hearing? 
 This critical ambiguity is evident in a recent exchange among lead-
ing scholars. In arguing for reduced federal habeas jurisdiction, Hoff-
man and King assume that systemic fairness is all that is required: they 
suggest that Suspension Clause challenges would take place on a state-
by-state, rather than a case-by-case, basis.234 In their response, Profes-
sors John Blume, Sheri Lynn Johnson, and Keir Weyble take the posi-
tion that the Suspension Clause requires an individualized inquiry, 
pointing out the Court’s reliance, recognized in Boumediene, on indi-
vidual savings clauses when upholding habeas substitutes in prior cas-
s.23
answer. Requiring “a full and fair opportunity to develop the factual 
                                                                                                                     
e 5 
 Not surprisingly, then, the precedent does not provide an obvious 
 
231 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 790–91. 
232 Professor Marceau reaches the same conclusion under the Due Process Clause, lo-
cating a due process right to a “full and fair hearing” in Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 91 
(1923); Frank, 237 U.S. at 335; and more recent cases such as Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 
U.S. 930, 948–49 (2007); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976); and Townsend, 372 U.S. 
at 312–13, 318. See Marceau, supra note 19, at 7–20. 
233 For a discussion of postconviction due process, see supra Section II.C, notes 174–
203 and accompanying text. 
234 Hoffman & King, supra note 16, at 845–46 (“We recognize that any statutory restric-
tion of habeas review will prompt prisoners seeking habeas relief to challenge the new 
habeas statute under the Suspension Clause . . . . [The burden on federal courts created by 
additional Suspension Clause litigation], however, should diminish quickly as the Supreme 
Court decides whether the review processes in various states are such that the proposed 
new habeas restrictions comply with the Suspension Clause.” (footnotes omitted)). 
235 Blume et al., supra note 118, at 463–64 (citing Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 776; Swain v. 
Pressly, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); and United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952)). 
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predicate of [a petitioner’s] claims”236 recalls Townsend v. Sain and its 
individualized inquiry into the adequacy of the state hearing, under 
which a federal evidentiary hearing is required if the state did not give 
the petitioner a full and fair hearing.237 A state hearing is not full and 
fair under Townsend if, inter alia, the material facts were not adequately 
developed at the state court hearing or there is a substantial allegation 
of newly discovered evidence.238 The key passage from Boumediene, 
however, also recalls the standard from Stone v. Powell.239 In Stone, the 
Court held that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full 
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim,”240 state prisoners 
could not be granted federal habeas relief on Fourth Amendment 
grounds.241 
                                                                                                                      
 
236 Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 790. 
237 372 U.S. at 313. Townsend held that under the version of § 2254 then in force, a 
federal evidentiary hearing was required if: 
“(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; 
(2) the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the record as a 
whole; (3) the fact-finding procedure employed by the state court was not ad-
equate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of 
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately devel-
oped at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state 
trier of fact did not afford the habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.” 
Id.; see also Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330, 360 (3d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (Sloviter, J., dis-
senting) (“The Supreme Court has never disavowed or retreated from its decision in Town-
send v. Sain. The Court cited Townsend in Boumediene v. Bush, and placed the constitutional 
right to habeas corpus above even Congress’ power to emasculate its essential features, 
such as the right to a hearing.” (citation omitted)). 
238 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 313. 
239 Compare Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 790–91 (holding that a detainee must have an op-
portunity for further factual development when “the underlying detention proceedings 
lack the necessary adversarial character”), with Stone, 428 U.S. at 494 (holding that a state 
prisoner may not obtain federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that unconstitutionally 
obtained evidence was used at trial if the state has provided “an opportunity for full and 
fair litigation”). 
240 Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. In so doing it partially adopted the “process model” of ha-
beas long advocated by Professor Paul Bator. See Yackle, supra note 39, at 1014–19, 1026 
(discussing the roots of the process model and arguing (in critique of the process model) 
that federal review is premised on a “general right” to a federal forum to address federal 
claims rather than ensuring a minimal amount of process). Stone can also be seen as an 
adoption of the “claims-based approach to federal habeas review in which some constitu-
tional rights are cognizable on federal habeas while others are not.” Primus, supra note 35, 
at 25 (citing Brian M. Hoffstadt, How Congress Might Redesign a Leaner, Cleaner Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, 49 Duke L.J. 947, 1013–23 (2000)). 
241 Stone, 428 U.S. at 494. The exact relationship between Stone and Townsend, to which 
Stone gave a “cf.” citation, remains unclear. Hertz & Liebman, supra note 65, § 27.3a; see 
Yackle, supra note 39, at 1054–55 (“It is not at all clear . . . whether the full and fair hearing 
idea from Townsend—a case about factfinding in habeas—can be of help in determining 
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 Courts have long been uncertain as to the interpretation of “op-
portunity” in Stone.242 “Opportunity” could mean simply that a peti-
tioner’s failure to litigate the claim in state court prevents federal ha-
beas consideration, but it could also mean that a petitioner, however 
diligent and deserving, need not actually receive an adequate hearing 
so long as the state’s procedures provided an opportunity for one.243 
There is a longstanding circuit split on the key issue: how much scru-
tiny, if any, should the process actually provided in the case (as opposed 
to the process theoretically due under state law) receive?244 On one hand, 
the Eleventh Circuit has held that the Stone bar does not apply unless 
the state court “fully and fairly” considered the claim,245 which requires 
“at least one evidentiary hearing in a trial court and the availability of 
meaningful appellate review when there are facts in dispute.”246 The 
Fifth Circuit, on the other hand, looks only to see if “state processes 
routinely or systematically are applied in such a way as to prevent the 
actual litigation of Fourth Amendment claims.”247 In between, the ma-
jority of the circuits appear to hold that if a state’s procedures are gen-
erally adequate, only an egregious or “unconscionable” error in an in-
dividual case will overcome Stone.248 
                                                                                                                      
 
whether the state courts accorded a litigant an opportunity for full and fair litigation of a 
substantive Fourth Amendment claim within the meaning of Stone.” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
242 See Shoemaker v. Riley, 459 U.S. 948, 948–49 (1982) (White, J., dissenting from de-
nial of certiorari). 
243 See id. 
244 See id. (“[T]he Courts of Appeals have divided as to the meaning of the phrase ‘an 
opportunity for full and fair litigation.’”); Bravo v. Hedgepeth, No. CV 10-2687-PSG(E), 
2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24259, at *16–18 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 2011); Hertz & Liebman, supra 
note 65, § 27.3a; see also Marceau, supra note 19, at 36–38. 
245 Tukes v. Dugger, 911 F.2d 508, 513 (11th Cir. 1990). 
246 Lawhorn v. Allen, 519 F.3d 1272, 1287 (11th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
247 Janecka v. Cockrell, 301 F.3d 316, 321 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Marceau, supra note 
19, at 37–38 (arguing that the Fifth Circuit’s approach is inconsistent with due process). 
248 See, e.g., Cabrera v. Hinsley, 324 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Stone would not 
block habeas review if the [state review] mechanism was in some way a sham. For instance, 
Stone would not block habeas review if the judge had his mind closed to the necessity of a 
hearing, or was bribed . . . or in some other obvious way subverted the hearing.”); Sanna v. 
Dipaolo, 265 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that Stone bars relief unless “the petitioner 
can show an irretrievable breakdown in the process provided by the state,” and emphasiz-
ing that this is an exception that is “a rule of last resort, to be applied sparingly”); Willett v. 
Lockhart, 37 F.3d 1265, 1272 (8th Cir. 1994) (en banc) (“[W]ith a state court mechanism 
for consideration of [Fourth Amendment] claims in place, we think that it will be the rare 
case where there is a failure of that mechanism that reaches constitutional dimensions.”); 
Capellan v. Riley, 975 F.2d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that the Stone bar is overcome “if 
the state has provided a corrective mechanism, but the defendant was precluded from 
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 Even if the Court decides that the Suspension Clause guarantees 
only that habeas petitioners have access to one generally fair fact devel-
opment process for their constitutional claims—as the majority of 
courts have suggested—the Clause may still provide a remedy for some, 
though far fewer, petitioners if AEDPA is construed after Pinholster to 
bar federal fact development regardless of the state procedures em-
ployed. As discussed below, some state postconviction regimes may be 
facially inadequate.249 But regardless of how AEDPA or the Suspension 
Clause is interpreted, state prisoners may—and after Pinholster increas-
ingly will—challenge state postconviction procedures under the Due 
Process Clause. These challenges, too, will require the resolution of lin-
gering questions. 
B. A Due Process Right to a Fundamentally Fair State  
Postconviction Proceeding 
 The Supreme Court’s recent decisions have affirmed state prison-
ers’ right to bring due process challenges to state postconviction pro-
ceedings in federal courts through § 1983.250 In light of the increased 
importance of developing the state record after Pinholster, these claims 
will likely proliferate independent of any developments in the law of 
federal habeas. In due process challenges, unlike those brought under 
the Suspension Clause, Pinholster’s bar on a federal hearing does not 
itself cause the constitutional violation. Rather, defendants have an in-
dependent constitutional right under the Due Process Clause to a fun-
damentally fair proceeding in the state postconviction process. These 
claims, like those under the Suspension Clause, will implicate funda-
mental questions about the nature of the right at issue. 
 To succeed in a due process argument, the petitioner must first 
clearly define the federal due process rights that attach to state post-
conviction proceedings.251 A showing that a state court failed to comply 
with its own procedural rules will not typically be adequate. Instead, the 
petitioner must point to a result252 of a process that makes the peti-
                                                                                                                      
 
using that mechanism because of an unconscionable breakdown in the underlying proc-
ess”). 
249 See infra notes 250–260 and accompanying text. 
250 See infra note 255 and accompanying text. 
251 See 15 Am. Jur. 2d Civil Rights § 148 (2012). 
252 Even a federal constitutional violation that occurs within the state process is not ad-
equate grounds for habeas relief. The procedural due process error must have affected 
“the judgment which provides the basis for [petitioner’s] incarceration.” See United States 
1000 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:953 
tioner’s custody unconstitutional.253 Further, a § 1983 claim must not 
“necessarily imply the invalidity of [a] conviction.”254 Nonetheless, two 
recent Supreme Court decisions strongly suggest that state postconvic-
tion procedures will be subject to procedural due process challenges 
under § 1983.255 
 All fifty states, although not required to offer postconviction re-
view, have chosen to do so.256 Having made that choice, they have cre-
                                                                                                                      
v. Dago, 441 F.3d 1238, 1248 (10th Cir. 2006) (quoting Sellers v. Ward, 135 F.3d 1333, 1339 
(10th Cir. 1998)). 
253 See, e.g., Thomason v. Ludwick, No. 2:09-11012, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74679, at 
*34–35 (E.D. Mich. July 12, 2011) (holding that in denying a post-Pinholster claim, a state 
hearing violated due process and was an unreasonable application of federal law, and not-
ing that “[w]hether or not the Michigan courts complied with the procedural require-
ments of Michigan law is not a matter for this court to decide on a petition for habeas 
corpus relief,” but “[r]ather, in terms of granting habeas relief, the relevant inquiry is only 
whether the state court decision was in violation of [Petitioner’s] federal constitutional 
rights” (quoting Hayes v. Prelesnik, 193 F. App’x 577, 584 (6th Cir. 2006))). 
254 Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S. Ct. 1289, 1298 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
255 Similarly, some petitioners with underlying claims for which the Supreme Court has 
established procedural requirements may argue that the state court’s failure to follow 
those procedures violated federal law. In Panetti, for example, the Supreme Court held 
that the procedure followed by the state court for determining whether the petitioner was 
competent to be executed was an unreasonable application of federal law as established by 
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 423–24 (1986). Panetti, 551 U.S. at 954; see also Wiley v. 
Epps, 625 F.3d 199, 211 (5th Cir. 2010) (finding that the court “must consider whether 
that court’s application of its own standards and precedent resulted in a denial of due 
process under the federal Constitution” and that the “state court’s departure from its own 
. . . standards in the face of Wiley’s evidence of retardation failed to provide Wiley with the 
minimum constitutional protections”); id. at 207 (explaining that although “Atkins [v. Vir-
ginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)] left to the states the job of implementing procedures for de-
termining who is mentally retarded,” the decision was made against the “backdrop” of 
federal due process requirements, including Ford’s requirement of a hearing upon a show-
ing of insanity (citing Rivera v. Quarterman, 505 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2007))). Similarly, 
in another post-Pinholster case, a petitioner raising a plausible Batson challenge to the jury 
selection used at his trial diligently sought and was denied a copy of the voir dire tran-
script. Pao Lo v. Kane, No. 2:05-cv-1754-MCE TJB, 2011 WL 2462932, at *5, *31 (E.D. Cal. 
June 17, 2011). The Petitioner, who was Asian, argued that many potential jurors of Asian 
descent were questioned during voir dire, and “[d]espite their availability and otherwise 
apparent suitability, the prosecutor used peremptory challenges to cause their dismissal” 
without providing plausible reasons for the challenges. Id. at *28, *31. The court found 
that the voir dire transcript “was necessary if Petitioner was ever going to prove his stand 
alone Batson claim as well as his ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim for failing 
to raise the Batson issue on direct appeal,” and held that the state court’s refusal to provide 
the transcript was an unreasonable application of federal law. Id. at *31–32. The magistrate 
judge, after finding that the state court had not met § 2254(d)(1), then conducted de 
novo review of the Batson and Strickland ineffective assistance claims and recommended 
granting the writ. Id. at *32, *46. 
256 See Lackawanna Cnty. Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394, 402 (2001) (“[E]ach 
State has created mechanisms for both direct appeal and state postconviction review, even 
though there is no constitutional mandate that they do so.” (citations omitted)). 
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ated a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause.257 This lib-
erty interest is not as strong as the interest that attaches pre-conviction, 
when the individual is still presumed innocent,258 but, under the Su-
preme Court’s recent decision in Osborne, it “begets” limited procedural 
due process rights.259 
 As established in Osborne, a federal procedural due process viola-
tion occurs in a state’s postconviction processes when a state court’s 
“consideration of [a] claim within the framework of the State’s proce-
dures for postconviction relief ‘offends some principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked 
as fundamental,’ or ‘transgresses any recognized principle of funda-
mental fairness in operation.’”260 The Court in Osborne did not, how-
ever, explain what fundamental fairness in postconviction review re-
quires, instead holding that “[w]hen a State chooses to offer help to 
those seeking relief from convictions, due process does not dictat[e] 
                                                                                                                      
257 See Dist. Attorney’s Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2319 (2009) (holding that 
Osborne had a “liberty interest in demonstrating his innocence with new evidence under 
state law” because the State of Alaska has established procedures for establishing inno-
cence based on newly discovered evidence); id. (“[A] state-created right can, in some cir-
cumstances, beget yet other rights to procedures essential to the realization of the parent 
right.” (quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 463 (1981))); see also 
Hertz & Liebman, supra note 65, § 7.1 (“[E]ven if the Constitution has nothing to say on 
the question whether States must provide state postconviction procedures or on whether 
any procedures they do provide must be minimally fair, the Constitution clearly does re-
quire that any—or at least the initial—direct appellate procedure that a State provides 
defendants as of right must meet minimal standards of fairness and due process.”). 
258 The Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear that the due process protections en-
joyed by individuals in the postconviction process are weaker than those that attach prior to 
and at trial. See Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (“A criminal defendant proved guilty after a fair 
trial does not have the same liberty interests as a free man. At trial, the defendant is pre-
sumed innocent and may demand that the government prove its case beyond reasonable 
doubt. But ‘[o]nce a defendant has been afforded a fair trial and convicted of the offense for 
which he was charged, the presumption of innocence disappears.’” (quoting Herrera v. Col-
lins, 506 U.S. 390, 399 (1993))). The petitioner no longer has a right to his physical liberty 
following a conviction, and the postconviction liberty interest and attendant procedures re-
quired to protect the interest are substantially circumscribed. Id. (“‘Given a valid conviction, 
the criminal defendant has been constitutionally deprived of his liberty.’” (quoting Dumschat, 
452 U.S. at 464)). 
259 Id. at 2320–21, 2322 (holding that Osborne had no substantive due process right 
“in the circumstances of this case,” but recognizing a procedural due process right to 
“fundamental fairness” in the procedures available for demonstrating innocence on the 
basis of new evidence after conviction). A petitioner could also raise an Osborne due proc-
ess argument under § 2254(d)(1)—arguing that the state court unreasonably applied fed-
eral law by failing to provide due process—but in this posture a petitioner would, of 
course, be saddled with AEDPA deference. 
260 Id. at 2320 (quoting Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446, 448 (1992)). 
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the exact form such assistance must assume.”261 The Court must there-
fore more clearly define the contours of this right, particularly as Pin-
holster encourages more due process challenges. At a minimum, how-
ever, it appears that a petitioner must have a right to present evidence, 
a meaningful evidentiary hearing if there are disputed material facts, 
and discovery for good cause.262 
 Professor Brandon Garrett, observing that “[f]ew rulings address 
the [necessary] scope of state postconviction procedures,”263 has none-
theless expressed guarded optimism for the efficacy of facial challenges 
to state postconviction DNA testing provisions using the fundamental 
fairness test. “[S]tatutes in some states that do not grant discovery or 
testing to those who could reasonably prove innocence may be vulner-
able to due process challenges. In a series of states, the Osborne ruling 
could trigger successful challenges to restrictions on access to postcon-
viction discovery.”264 Similarly, a scheme like Virginia’s, in which courts 
will not, under any circumstances, consider evidence not included in 
an initial habeas petition, may well violate due process under Osborne.265 
 In many states, however, as-applied challenges to the denial of fact 
development would be more fruitful—and may well be normatively de-
sirable, particularly in light of Pinholster. Osborne is, however, ambiguous 
as to whether they are allowed. Most states allow post-trial discovery 
and/or an evidentiary hearing either for “good cause” or at the court’s 
discretion.266 These statutes are almost certainly constitutional on their 
face under Osborne, but the decisions made under them can be arbi-
trary in practice.267 When fact development of plausible claims for re-
                                                                                                                      
261 Id. (second alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
262 See Brandon L. Garrett, DNA and Due Process, 78 Fordham L. Rev. 2919, 2941–42 
(2010) (noting that the Court in Osborne cited to Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974), 
which, in Garrett’s terms, guarantees “notice, an opportunity to present documentary 
evidence, and a right to obtain discovery, including by taking witness statements, obtaining 
documents, and calling witnesses”); see also Marceau, supra note 19, at 24 n.107 (equating 
fundamental fairness with the full and fair hearing requirement); id. at 36 (proposing that 
“where there are material facts in dispute that cannot be resolved on the record alone, a 
process that fails to provide a meaningful opportunity to discover and produce evidence, 
fails to provide an opportunity to confront witnesses where necessary, and fails to make 
relevant findings of fact will not be full and fair”). 
263 Garrett, supra note 262, at 2940. 
264 Id. at 2946. 
265 See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1418 n.6 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(describing Virginia’s rule). 
266 See supra notes 118 and 121. 
267 See, e.g., Primus, supra note 35, at 19 (explaining that “Oklahoma courts deny virtu-
ally all motions to remand cases for evidentiary development of ineffectiveness claims”). 
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lief is arbitrarily denied or curtailed,268 an argument can be made un-
der Osborne that the state’s postconviction procedures violate a “recog-
nized principle of fundamental fairness [that is, nonarbitrariness] in 
operation.”269 Such an argument is facially consistent with the Osborne 
majority’s emphasis on Osborne’s alleged failure to seek DNA testing 
through Alaska’s postconviction discovery procedures or under the 
Alaska Constitution.270 Those “procedures are adequate on their face,” 
the Court stated, “and without trying them, Osborne can hardly com-
plain that they do not work in practice.”271 Further, the majority noted, 
if Alaska were to reject a future request by Osborne under those provi-
sions, “it may be for a perfectly adequate reason, just as the federal stat-
ute and all state statutes impose conditions and limits on access to DNA 
evidence.”272 
 The Court’s linking of an “adequate reason” to deny Osborne test-
ing with statutory limits on access to evidence in other jurisdictions, 
however, suggests a more limited reading. The Alaska state right to 
DNA testing at issue in Osborne was new, “uncertain[],” and judicially 
created,273—thus, any reasoned decision denying Osborne testing 
would have been a meaningful step towards defining the contours of 
the right. Arguably, then, the Court’s interest in how the Alaskan re-
gime works “in practice” was rooted not in a concern that the proce-
dures might be arbitrarily applied to Osborne, but in a concern that 
the procedures themselves, once announced, be categorically fair.274 
                                                                                                                      
 
268 For one example of arguably arbitrary denial of fact development, see Richards v. 
Quarterman (Richards II ), 566 F.3d 553, 559, 563 (5th Cir. 2009) (explaining that the state 
court hearing on petitioner’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim consisted “only of an 
affidavit from Richards’s trial counsel” with conclusory statements and sparse explana-
tion). 
269 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320 (quoting Medina, 505 U.S. at 446, 448); see Garrett, supra 
note 262, at 2949 (“The Court in Osborne did inquire into the state courts’ reasons for de-
nying relief, as well as the adequacy of the state process. If courts interpret state materiality 
requirements in an arbitrary fashion, then they should be subject to due process scru-
tiny.”). 
270 Osborne, 129 S. Ct. at 2320–21. 
271 Id. at 2321. 
272 Id. 
273 Id. at 2320–21. 
274 This reading is also supported by Medina (the source of the “in operation” language), 
in which the inquiry was limited to the general operation of the statute, not its application to 
the petitioner. 505 U.S. at 448. More generally, non-arbitrariness is a substantive rather than a 
procedural due process concept, and Osborne itself rejected the existence of a substantive due 
process right to postconviction DNA evidence. 129 S. Ct. at 2322. This objection probably 
misapprehends the nature of the putative claim, which is not to a freestanding right to a 
postconviction hearing or discovery (although such a right might still be guaranteed by the 
Due Process and/or Suspension Clauses), but rather a general right to be free from arbitrary 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court’s recent characterization of Osborne as “re-
ject[ing] the extension of substantive due process” to a prisoner’s re-
quest for DNA testing and “le[aving] slim room for the prisoner to 
show that the governing state law denies him procedural due process” 
is consistent with a skeptical view of Osborne as a source of review of in-
dividual state discovery decisions.275 
 Between the extremes of facial challenges to state postconviction 
fact development regimes and challenges based on a singular, arbitrary 
decision under that regime276 lies a claim that a particular rule, al-
though facially consistent with due process, is unconstitutional as it is 
generally (or at least frequently) applied. By demonstrating a pattern 
of, for example, arbitrary denials of meaningful hearings on plausible 
factual allegations that would give rise to relief, petitioners may be able 
to convince federal courts that the state procedures are, in practice, 
fundamentally unfair.277 
 Osborne, then, can in at least some cases provide the substance of a 
federal remedy for unfair state postconviction fact development proce-
dures.278 Section 1983, as recently affirmed in Skinner, can provide the 
procedural vehicle for these challenges.279 Skinner had requested and 
been denied testing under Texas’s postconviction DNA access statute 
                                                                                                                      
state action. See, e.g., Nicholas v. Pa. State Univ., 227 F.3d 133, 139 (3d Cir. 2000) (“[A] non-
legislative government deprivation that comports with procedural due process may still give 
rise to a substantive due process claim upon allegations that the government deliberately and 
arbitrarily abused its power.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 Colum. L. 
Rev. 309, 322–23 & n.79 (1993). Nonetheless, the Supreme Court “has not definitively held 
that all arbitrary official conduct violates the Constitution,” and further, has frequently ab-
stained from deciding substantive due process issues when they arise from isolated, arbitrary 
state adjudications of non-fundamental rights. Fallon, supra, at 324. 
275 See Skinner, 131 S. Ct. at 1293. 
276 Professor Marceau recognizes these extremes, noting that “there are unfair proce-
dures, and then there are fair procedures that are occasionally applied unfairly.” Marceau, 
supra note 19, at 34. 
277 See Fallon, supra note 274, at 347 (noting “the general principle of modern due 
process law that federal judicial oversight is appropriate in cases involving allegations of 
pervasive or widespread straying of government outside constitutional bounds”). Petition-
ers from states that offer counsel on postconviction review also may raise due process 
claims. Just as states’ choice to offer postconviction review triggers minimum due process 
requirements, their guarantee of postconviction counsel requires that they not arbitrarily 
deny counsel. Freedman, supra note 116, at 1095. 
278 Nonetheless, the Osborne standard is difficult to meet, and, depending on the test 
employed, it may be easier for a petitioner to show that the state’s determination of the 
facts was “unreasonable” under § 2254(d)(2). See supra notes 260–275 and accompanying 
text. Of course, courts may employ the Osborne test under § 2254(d)(2), if they choose to 
recognize a procedural component of reasonableness at all. 
279 See 131 S. Ct. at 1298. 
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and brought suit under § 1983 alleging that the statutory scheme de-
nied him procedural due process.280 Reversing the Fifth Circuit, the 
Court held that Skinner’s claim could be brought under § 1983 be-
cause “[s]uccess in his suit for DNA testing would not necessarily imply 
the invalidity of his conviction. While test results might prove exculpa-
tory, that outcome is hardly inevitable; [the] results might prove incon-
clusive or they might further incriminate Skinner.”281 This reasoning 
applies with equal force to a § 1983 claim for expanded fact develop-
ment in a state postconviction proceeding: although the plaintiff’s ul-
timate goal is presumably to vacate his conviction, success in the § 1983 
suit is, at best, a step in that direction.282 
 Taken together, Osborne and Skinner provide a roadmap to due 
process challenges to state postconviction fact development proce-
dures, and petitioners facing Pinholster’s bar on federal fact develop-
ment under § 2254(d) will increasingly take this route. Faced with these 
challenges, the Court will have to decide what type of “fundamental 
fairness” the Due Process Clause affords. 
Conclusion 
 Without the safeguard of federal fact development under 
§ 2254(d), cases of egregious unfairness in state postconviction proce-
dures will demand new solutions. There will undoubtedly be future 
cases in which the fact development consists of a single, ex parte affida-
vit produced in active collaboration with the state,283 or includes the 
judge’s independent collection of impeachment evidence from news-
                                                                                                                      
280 Id. at 1296. 
281 Id. at 1298. 
282 The Court had “not previously addressed whether due process challenges to state col-
lateral review procedures may be brought under § 1983.” Id. at 1302 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
Interestingly, although Justice Ginsberg, writing for the Court in Skinner, attempted to limit 
Skinner’s application to postconviction Brady claims on the grounds that successful Brady 
claims “necessarily yield[] evidence undermining a conviction,” id. at 1293, 1300 (majority 
opinion), the dissent is probably right to be skeptical of that claim, at least if taken broadly, 
see id. at 1303 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Although a § 1983 suit for Brady material itself is clear-
ly barred under Skinner, an “artfully plead[ed]” attack on the state habeas discovery proce-
dures governing access to potential Brady material would seem not to be—because that evi-
dence may not exist. See id. at 1303. Contra id. at 1300 (majority opinion). Indeed, at least one 
post-Pinholster § 1983 procedural due process challenge to state fact development has success-
fully invoked Skinner, although the underlying claim was based on Atkins rather than Brady. 
See Bedford v. Kasich, No. 2:11-cv-351, 2011 WL 1691823, at *3–4, *6–7 (S.D. Ohio May 4, 
2011). 
283 See, e.g., Richards v. Quarterman (Richards I ), 578 F. Supp. 2d 849, 852 (N.D. Tex. 
2008). 
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paper clippings.284 In the wake of Pinholster, then, the Court will be 
called upon to decide whether federal statutes and the federal Consti-
tution provide a concrete right to a fair hearing on postconviction re-
view or whether those rights (if they exist at all) are more abstract rights 
to a right to a fair hearing. 
 These issues represent a crossroads in the law of habeas corpus; 
their resolution will have a profound impact on the ability of state pris-
oners held in violation of the federal Constitution to obtain federal ha-
beas relief under AEDPA, and they will also figure largely in determin-
ing the viability of proposals to further limit federal habeas.285 The 
discussion of these questions in this Article is merely a starting point for 
their consideration after Pinholster; all clearly require more sustained 
consideration, and even then clear answers will likely be elusive. At one 
time, the existence of a federal requirement for fairness in every case, 
not just the average case, would have seemed a safe bet. The current 
trajectory of habeas law, however, places the issue in doubt. As the story 
goes, popular frustration with the perceived excesses of the Warren 
Court and the high cost of administering individual justice in an era of 
expanded criminal procedural rights and exploded prison populations 
has seen federalism, comity, and finality rival, if not eclipse, the vindica-
tion of constitutional rights as the primary concern of federal ha-
beas.286 It is, after all, a key feature of AEDPA that it does not allow a 
federal court to grant relief if it is merely convinced that the state 
court’s decision was wrong but not “objectively unreasonable.”287 Less 
starkly, the current Court is so concerned with respecting the sover-
eignty of state courts that it has rejected, without dissent, even the 
                                                                                                                      
284 See Merzbacher v. Shearin, 732 F. Supp. 2d 527, 556 (D. Md. 2010). 
285 See generally Blume et al., supra note 118 (arguing for the importance of federal ha-
beas rights); Hoffman & King, supra note 16 (proposing to abolish federal habeas in most 
non-capital cases). 
286 See Yackle, supra note 38, at 544 (explaining that, after Republican bills aimed at re-
stricting habeas by imposing “new procedural requirements for all state prisoners to meet 
in order to put the merits of their claims before federal courts” failed, the Rehnquist Court 
“took matters into its own hands” by requiring prisoners to “exhaust all available state ave-
nues for litigating federal claims in order to allow state courts the opportunity to correct 
their own errors”); id. at 545, 549 (describing how Rehnquist formed the Powell Commit-
tee, which “recommended especially state-friendly procedures in capital cases,” and adopt-
ed the Teague doctrine, which “usually bars federal habeas courts from considering claims 
that depend on new rules of federal law”). See generally Hammel, supra note 117 (tracing 
the development of doctrines that limit federal habeas review). 
287 See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1402 n.12 (2011) (applying this standard in 
rejecting relief); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409–10 (2000) (naming the “objectively 
unreasonable” standard). 
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rather intuitive notion that the goal of avoiding reversal by a federal 
court might shape state postconviction practices.288 
 Even so, the odds may still be reasonably good, depending on the 
stock one places in lofty rhetoric. As the Court reminded us in Boumedi-
ene, 
Habeas corpus is a collateral process that exists, in Justice 
Holmes’ words, to “cu[t] through all forms and g[o] to the 
very tissue of the structure. It comes in from the outside, not 
in subordination to the proceedings, and although every form 
may have been preserved opens the inquiry whether they 
have been more than an empty shell.”289 
A petitioner’s right to habeas corpus that is indifferent to manifest un-
fairness in the individual’s own case would indeed be a right to an emp-
ty shell. 
 
288 See Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 784 (2011) (“There is no merit to the asser-
tion that compliance with § 2254(d) should be excused when state courts issue summary 
rulings because applying § 2254(d) in those cases will encourage state courts to withhold 
explanations for their decisions. Opinion-writing practices in state courts are influenced by 
considerations other than avoiding scrutiny by collateral attack in federal court.”). 
289 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 785 (2008) (citing Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 
309, 346 (1915) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). 
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